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 INTRODUCTION 
Since 2009, Donald J. Trump has maintained a personal account on Twitter, a 
social media platform, using the “handle” @realDonaldTrump.  Like many of 
Twitter’s more than 300 million active users, Donald Trump uses his Twitter account 
as a means of communicating his own views to interested members of the public.  For 
nearly a decade, he has used that account to convey his thoughts on a wide variety of 
topics, ranging from popular culture to world affairs.  Since becoming President, he 
has continued to use that account in the same way.  In contrast to the official Twitter 
accounts of the President of the United States and the White House, which belong to 
the federal government, the @realDonaldTrump account belongs to him personally 
and will remain his account after he leaves office. 
During his presidency, Donald Trump has chosen to block a limited number of 
Twitter users from his personal Twitter account, including the individual plaintiffs in 
this case.  Blocking primarily limits the ability of the blocked user to interact with 
Donald Trump on his account, such as by preventing the user from replying directly 
to Donald Trump’s tweets or retweeting them.  The district court in this case ruled 
that when Donald Trump blocks other Twitter users from his personal Twitter 
account, in response to tweets criticizing him or his policies, he is violating the First 
Amendment by denying the blocked users access to a public forum.  That ruling is 
fundamentally misconceived. 
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The constitutional right of a private individual to express his or her views in a 
public forum comes into play only when the property in question is owned or 
controlled by the government and the individual’s exclusion from that property is the 
product of state action.  But here, the @realDonaldTrump account belongs to 
Donald Trump in his personal capacity and is subject to his personal control, not the 
control of the government.  And when he exercises the power enjoyed by all Twitter 
users to block other users from their own accounts, he is not using any authority 
belonging to or conferred on him by the federal government. 
The district court nevertheless concluded that the @realDonaldTrump account 
has become government-controlled property because Donald Trump now uses it to 
make statements about official matters and advocate the policies of his administration.  
But a government officer’s personal property is not transformed into government-
controlled property for purposes of the First Amendment merely because he makes 
public statements on it, and such statements likewise do not limit his ability to 
exercise his personal, not governmental, authority to exclude people from his own 
property.  If, for example, John F. Kennedy gave an official speech at his family 
compound at Hyannis Port, opened it up to a public audience, and allowed them to 
comment afterward, it plainly would not violate the First Amendment for him to 
exclude certain members of the public from his own property because they had 
previously criticized him.  And what is true for real property is just as true for 
intangible property in the form of a personal Twitter account.     
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 Nor is the @realDonaldTrump account a “forum” for public expression.  
Donald Trump uses it not to provide a platform for public discussion, but to 
disseminate his own views to the world.  When he blocks a particular user from 
reading or replying to his tweets, he is exercising his right to choose with whom he 
will engage in speech.  Nothing in the First Amendment divests him of that 
prerogative or compels him to receive messages that he does not wish to hear.  
Blocked users remain free to express their views to other Twitter users through their 
own Twitter accounts; the First Amendment does not entitle them to piggyback on 
Donald Trump’s speech to amplify their own. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Plaintiffs are asserting constitutional claims against defendants and invoked the 
district court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  On May 23, 2018, the district 
court entered a final order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment in part 
and granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment in part and denying it in part.  
Dkt. No. 72.  Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal on June 4, 2018.  A440; Fed. 
R. App. P. 4(a)(1).  This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether Donald Trump’s blocking of the individual plaintiffs from his 
personal Twitter account violates the First Amendment. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal arises from a suit brought by seven Twitter users (the “individual 
plaintiffs”) whom Donald J. Trump has blocked from interacting with his personal 
Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, and by the Knight First Amendment Institute 
at Columbia University (“Knight Institute”).  Plaintiffs sued Donald Trump, in his 
capacity as President of the United States; Daniel Scavino, Assistant to the President 
and White House Social Media Director; and two other members of the White House 
staff, alleging that the decision to block these users violated the First Amendment.  In 
May 2018, Judge Naomi Buchwald issued an order granting summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs with respect to defendants Donald Trump and Daniel Scavino, 
and dismissing the remaining defendants from the case.  Knight First Amendment Inst. at 
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).  Judge Buchwald issued 
a declaratory judgment that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the 
@realDonaldTrump account violated the First Amendment.   
A.  The Twitter Social Media Platform 
Twitter is a privately owned and operated social media platform that allows its 
“users”—businesses or members of the public who have created an account on the 
platform and agreed to Twitter’s terms of service—to post short messages known as 
“tweets.”  Stipulation ¶¶ 14, 17 (A45, A48).  Users may also repost or reply to other 
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users’ messages, and may interact with other Twitter users in relation to those 
messages.  Id. ¶¶ 21-23 (A49-A50).1 
When individuals create accounts on Twitter, they create a unique identifier (or 
“handle”) for their account and are given a webpage (sometimes called a “timeline”) 
that is associated with that account.  Stipulation ¶¶ 15-16 (A46-A47).  From that 
account, users can tweet short messages that appear on their timeline in reverse 
chronological order.  See id. ¶ 15, 17 (A46-A48).  By default, Twitter timelines are 
visible to everyone with internet access, including those who are not Twitter users.  Id. 
¶ 18 (A48). 
In addition to allowing its users to post tweets on their own webpages, Twitter 
enables users to interact with each other in a variety of ways.  Users can “favorite” or 
“like” another user’s tweet by clicking on a heart icon that appears under the tweet.  
Stipulation ¶ 24 (A51).  Users can also “mention” another user by including the other 
user’s Twitter handle in a tweet.  Id. ¶ 25 (A52).  A Twitter user mentioned by another 
user will receive a notification that he or she has been mentioned in the other user’s 
tweet.  Id.  And users may “follow” other users, which enables them to receive 
notifications every time that other user posts a tweet.  Id. ¶ 19 (A48).   
                                                 
1  At the time the stipulation was filed, tweets, replies, and retweets were limited 
to a total of 140 characters.  Stipulation ¶ 14 (A45).  Twitter has since changed its 
policy and expanded that limit to 280 characters.   
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A user may reply directly to another user’s tweet.  When a user replies to a 
tweet, the reply appears on the user’s own timeline under a tab labeled “Tweets & 
replies.”  Stipulation ¶ 22 (A49-A50).  A reply tweet may be as long as any other 
tweet, and can be replied to in turn by other users.  Id.  Replies are visible not only on 
the Twitter page of the replying user, but may also be accessed from the original user’s 
timeline.  Id. ¶ 23 (A50-A51).  Anyone who clicks on an original tweet will see a 
collection of any replies, with replies-to-replies nested below the replies to which they 
respond.  Id. 
Users may also “retweet”—i.e., repost—the tweets of other users, either by 
posting them directly to their own followers or by “quoting” them in their own 
tweets.  Id. ¶ 21 (A49).  When a user retweets a tweet, it appears on the user’s timeline 
in the same form as it did on the original user’s timeline, but with a notation 
indicating that the post was retweeted.  Id.  The same is true when a user quotes a 
tweet, except that the user may add commentary above the image of the original 
tweet. 
In addition to allowing its users to interact with each other, Twitter gives users 
several means to limit others from interacting with them.  First, users may “protect” 
their accounts.  When an account is protected, the user’s tweets are not visible to the 
general public, and may be seen (and replied to) only by those users that the account 
owner has affirmatively approved.  Stipulation ¶ 27 (A52).  Second, if account owners 
do not wish to prevent the public from seeing their tweets, but want to limit their 
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interactions with particular users, they may choose to “block” individual users’ 
accounts.  Id. ¶ 28 (A52).  The dispute in this case relates to this blocking feature. 
While logged into a blocked account, a user cannot see the blocking user’s 
tweets or use the Twitter platform to search for those tweets.  Stipulation ¶ 28 (A52).  
However, the blocked user can continue to view the blocking user’s tweets by using 
an internet browser or other application that is not logged in to the blocked Twitter 
account.  Id. ¶¶ 31, 55 (A54, A63-A64).  Blocking also prevents the blocked user from 
retweeting or replying to a blocking user’s tweets.  Id. ¶ 28 (A52).  Blocked users 
nevertheless can respond to the blocking user’s tweets by posting responsive tweets 
on their own Twitter pages and can mention the blocking user in those tweets, but the 
blocking user will not be notified of such tweets.  Id.  In addition, a blocked user can 
reply to other users’ replies to the blocking user’s tweets.  Id. ¶ 30 (A53-A54).  These 
replies-to-replies will appear in the collection of replies beneath the blocking users’ 
tweet.  Id.  Blocked users may also take screenshots of a tweet or reply and post a 
picture of that tweet to their own timeline with whatever commentary they would 
have included in a direct reply.  Id. ¶ 55 (A63-A64).     
Finally, users may “mute” other users.  Muted users continue to see all of the 
muting user’s tweets while logged into their own accounts, and they may retweet and 
reply to those tweets.  How to mute accounts on Twitter, Twitter,   
https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-mute (last visited July 24, 2018).  
However, unless the muting user follows the muted account, he will not receive 
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notifications when the muted user replies or mentions the muting user, and replies by 
the muted user will be invisible to the muting user if he clicks on the tweets that 
originated those replies.  Id.  Similarly, if an account that has not been muted quotes 
or retweets a tweet from an account that has been muted, the quoted tweet will be 
hidden from the muting user with a “This Tweet is unavailable” message.  Id. 
All of the features described above are part of the platform set up by Twitter 
and agreed to by users when they sign the terms of service.  See generally Twitter Terms of 
Service, Twitter, https://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited July 24, 2018).  A Twitter user 
cannot choose to have an account that has a subset of these features; for example, a 
user cannot obtain from Twitter an account that prohibits certain other users from 
blocking them. 
B. Donald Trump’s Personal Twitter Account 
Donald Trump established his personal Twitter account, @realDonaldTrump, 
in March 2009.  Stipulation ¶ 32 (A54).  The account is not protected, meaning that 
any member of the public can view his tweets without his approval and even without 
having a Twitter account.  Id. ¶ 36 (A55).   
Before assuming the Presidency in January 2017, Donald Trump used his 
account to tweet about a variety of topics, including popular culture and politics.  
Stipulation ¶ 32 (A54).  He has continued to use the @realDonaldTrump account 
since his inauguration.  Id.  Through it, he communicates with the public through 
statements about official matters and other comments about his administration, 
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opines on public events, and also continues to post purely personal tweets unrelated 
to government policies and issues.  See id. 
In certain instances, Donald Trump enlists the assistance of Daniel Scavino, an 
Assistant to the President, in posting tweets to the @realDonaldTrump account.  
Stipulation ¶ 38 (A56).  The President and the White House also operate two 
government Twitter accounts:  @POTUS and @WhiteHouse.  Id. ¶ 45 (A60).   
Between May and June 2017, Donald Trump blocked Twitter accounts 
belonging to the seven individual plaintiffs from his personal Twitter account.  
Stipulation ¶¶ 46-52 (A60-A62).  Each of the individual plaintiffs had posted a reply 
to an @realDonaldTrump tweet shortly before being blocked.  Id.  The replies 
generally expressed displeasure with the President, in some cases with inflammatory 
language.  See, e.g., id. ¶ 47 (A60-A61) (reply calling him a “Corrupt Incompetent 
Authoritarian”).   
By blocking the individual plaintiffs, Donald Trump prevented them from 
directly interacting with him on Twitter.  The blocked plaintiffs cannot view 
@realDonaldTrump tweets while logged into their accounts or retweet or directly 
reply to those tweets.  Stipulation ¶ 54 (A62-A63).  Plaintiffs can, however, view 
tweets posted by @realDonaldTrump when not logged into their blocked accounts, 
or when logged into any other unblocked accounts they have.  Id. ¶¶ 55, 56 (A63-
A64).  Blocking the plaintiffs does not prevent them from interacting with others on 
Twitter or from continuing to criticize Donald Trump or his administration on that 
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platform.  Even while logged in to their blocked accounts, plaintiffs may mention 
@realDonaldTrump in their own tweets, and may post screenshots of 
@realDonaldTrump tweets with their own commentary.  See id. ¶¶ 28, 55 (A52, A63).  
They may also view reply tweets posted in response to @realDonaldTrump tweets, 
and can post replies to those replies.  Id. ¶ 57 (A64).  Those replies-to-replies appear 
in the collections of replies beneath @realDonaldTrump tweets for all to see.  Id.  
Indeed, all but one of the individual plaintiffs have, despite being blocked, 
participated in conversations with other Twitter users by replying to replies to 
@realDonaldTrump tweets.  Id. ¶ 58 (A65-A66).   
C. Procedural Background 
1. Complaint and Motions for Summary Judgment 
In July 2017, the individual plaintiffs and the Knight Institute filed this civil 
action against Donald Trump, Daniel Scavino, and two other White House staff 
members.  Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Donald Trump’s decision to 
block the individual plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account.  A16-A40.  They 
sought a declaration that blocking the individual plaintiffs was unconstitutional and an 
injunction requiring the defendants to unblock the individual plaintiffs.  A39-A40.  
The parties entered a stipulation of facts and cross-moved for summary judgment on 
the basis of the stipulation.  See A41-A42 (Joint Letter Motion for Leave to file 
Stipulation); A43-A67 (Joint Stipulation); A68-A71 (Joint Notice of Filing Exhibits to 
Stipulation); A72-A364 (Exhibits to Stipulation).  
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Among other things, the parties stipulated that the @realDonaldTrump 
account was created in March 2009, long before Donald Trump’s inauguration.  
Stipulation ¶ 32 (A54).  The parties further stipulated that the @realDonaldTrump 
account has been used since the inauguration to announce matters related to official 
government business, but that Donald Trump also continues to use the account to 
communicate about issues entirely unrelated to government business.  Id. ¶¶ 32, 38 
(A54, A56).  The stipulation provides that, for the purpose of this litigation, the 
defendants do not contest that the individual plaintiffs had been blocked from 
@realDonaldTrump because they had posted tweets that criticized Donald Trump or 
his policies, A43. 
Based on the stipulations, the plaintiffs claimed that Donald Trump’s decision 
to block the individual plaintiffs from his personal Twitter account constitutes a 
viewpoint-based restriction on access to a public forum and access to official 
statements.  The plaintiffs based that claim on the First Amendment’s public forum 
doctrine, which concerns the circumstances in which the government may restrict 
private access for expressive purposes to property that it owns or controls.  Plaintiffs 
also claimed that the decision imposes a viewpoint-based restriction on their ability to 
petition the government for redress of grievances. 
In addition to arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing, the defendants responded 
on the merits that Donald Trump’s decision to block the plaintiffs from his personal 
Twitter account was not state action and is therefore outside the ambit of the First 
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Amendment.  They likewise argued that the @realDonaldTrump account is not a 
government-controlled venue for private speech subject to the strictures of the 
public-forum doctrine, but rather, a private platform used by Donald Trump to 
disseminate his own speech.   
2. The District Court’s Decision 
In May 2018, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of 
the plaintiffs against defendants Trump and Scavino.  At the outset, the district court 
dismissed the claims against two defendants (Sarah Huckabee Sanders and Hope 
Hicks) because they did not have authority to operate the @realDonaldTrump 
account, SPA.15 n.6, SPA.24, but the court determined that plaintiffs had standing to 
pursue claims against Donald Trump and Daniel Scavino.  SPA.25-SPA.33.   
Turning to the merits, the court held that the blocking of the individual 
plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account violates the First Amendment.  The 
court arrived at that holding by analyzing the account under the public-forum 
doctrine and determining that the blocking of the plaintiffs was an impermissible 
restriction on access to a public forum.  
The district court did not directly address the defendants’ argument that the 
blocking of the individual plaintiffs was not state action because it was done by 
Donald Trump in his personal capacity, exercising purely private rather than 
governmental authority over his personal Twitter account.  Instead, the court 
reasoned that a separate inquiry into state action is unnecessary when a case involves 
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access to a forum owned or controlled by the government.  The court held that 
Donald Trump and Daniel Scavino exercise control over the @realDonaldTrump 
account and that their control is governmental, principally because Donald Trump 
now uses the account, inter alia, to make statements about official matters and perform 
official functions.  SPA.45-SPA.48.   
The district court then undertook to define the contours of the putative “public 
forum” for First Amendment purposes.  SPA.51-SPA.58.  The court excluded the 
content of Donald Trump’s tweets about official matters, which it rightly regarded as 
government speech not subject to the First Amendment.  SPA.54.  The court also 
held that the comment threads on @realDonaldTrump, “consisting of the initial tweet 
[by Donald Trump], direct replies to that tweet, and second-order (and higher-order) 
replies to those replies,” are not a forum.  SPA.50.  However, the court concluded 
that the “interactive space for replies and retweets created by each tweet sent by the 
@realDonaldTrump account” qualifies as a public forum for First Amendment 
purposes.  SPA.54-SPA.55. 
The court classified this “interactive space” as a “designated public forum” 
because it is accessible to the public at large, and anyone with a Twitter account that 
has not been blocked may participate in that space by replying to or retweeting the 
President’s tweets.  SPA.60-SPA.61.  Having classified the “space” as a designated 
public forum, the court held that the blocking of the individual plaintiffs based on 
their viewpoint was a constitutionally impermissible restriction on access to the 
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forum.  SPA.63-SPA.64.  The court reasoned that if Donald Trump wished to 
exercise his right not to listen to these plaintiffs, he could do so by muting them, 
which would not prevent the muted users from accessing the interactive space 
beneath his own tweets.  SPA.66-SPA.68.   
The court accordingly granted plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment 
in part.  The court declined to issue an injunction, concluding that a declaratory 
judgment was likely to afford plaintiffs the relief they sought.  SPA.69-SPA.74. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 Since 2009, Donald Trump has used his personal Twitter account, 
@realDonaldTrump, to share his opinions on popular culture, world affairs, and 
politics.  Though the account undoubtedly has garnered more followers and public 
interest since Donald Trump became President, its essential nature has not changed.  
It remains a private mechanism that Donald Trump possesses to communicate 
statements he wishes to make to his followers on Twitter and to any other person 
who visits the @realDonaldTrump page.   
 The district court concluded that Donald Trump’s decision to block the 
individual plaintiffs from his personal Twitter account violated the First Amendment 
because they can no longer reply directly to tweets posted by Donald Trump on that 
account.  The district court further concluded that the @realDonaldTrump account, a 
personal account on a privately-controlled social media platform used by Donald 
Trump to facilitate his own expression, is a government-controlled forum for public 
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speech.  In so holding, the district court engaged in an unprecedented expansion of 
the public-forum doctrine, transforming it from a bulwark against governmental 
regulation of speech into a tool for judicial superintendence of personal Twitter 
accounts and private interactions among Twitter users. 
 This Court should reject that result.  The public-forum doctrine does not come 
into play unless a plaintiff has been excluded from a space that is owned or controlled 
by the government.  E.g., West Farms Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm’n, 951 F.2d 469, 473 
(2d Cir. 1991).  And because the Constitution protects only against government 
abridgement of speech, exclusion from such space must be attributable to the use of 
governmental, rather than private, authority.  E.g., Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 
396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005).  Here, the @realDonaldTrump account is neither 
owned nor controlled by the federal government; it belongs to Donald Trump in his 
personal capacity.  And his use of the block function—a feature that was created by 
Twitter, a private corporation, and made available to all Twitter users—is merely an 
exercise of his personal, not governmental, authority to exclude individuals from that 
private account.   
 The district court concluded that Donald Trump’s personal Twitter account 
has been transformed into government-controlled property because he has used that 
account to post messages relating to the affairs of his administration.  That improperly 
conflates the President’s private property with his use of that property to further 
public functions.  For example, Presidents have long sought respite from the White 
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House at private residences they own:  before Donald J. Trump and Mar-a-Lago, 
there was George W. Bush and his Crawford ranch, John F. Kennedy and his family 
compound in Hyannis Port, and Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Hyde Park estate, to 
name but a few.  No one could seriously contend that if any of those Presidents 
opened up their private residences for the public at large to attend an official speech 
and then engage in a town-hall-style debate, the First Amendment would somehow 
constrain them from nevertheless excluding from their own homes certain individuals 
who had previously criticized them and with whom they did not wish to 
communicate, or that it would constrain their choice of audience members to take 
questions from, thereby providing a platform for some voices, while necessarily 
excluding others.  Their choice to host such a speech does not somehow transform 
their property into the property of the government, and they would remain free to 
exercise private control over use of and access to such property.   
This common-sense rule for real property owned by public officials applies no 
less to intangible property like a personal Twitter account.  Donald Trump’s use of 
@realDonaldTrump to make statements about official matters does not transform his 
personal Twitter account into one controlled by the government.  Likewise, such use 
does not alter the fundamentally private, rather than governmental, nature of the 
authority exercised by Donald Trump over access to that account. 
 Nor is the @realDonaldTrump account a public forum, in whole or in part.  
Since its creation, Donald Trump has used the account as a platform for his own 
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speech, not as a place for the private expression of others.  Twitter’s terms and 
conditions allow its users to interact with each other by, inter alia, replying to or 
retweeting another user’s tweets, and to that extent, Twitter as a social media platform 
may be a private forum for public expressive conduct (though not a public forum in 
the First Amendment sense).  But the @realDonaldTrump account is simply the 
means through which Donald Trump participates in that forum; it is not a public 
forum itself. 
 By blocking the plaintiffs, Donald Trump has limited their ability to reply 
directly to his tweets on @realDonaldTrump.  But that limitation does not implicate 
the First Amendment.  See Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 
288 (1984) (“A person’s right to speak is not infringed when the government simply 
ignores that person while listening to others.”).  Nothing in the First Amendment 
divests Donald Trump of the ability to decline to receive messages on his private 
property that he does not wish to hear, nor does it compel him to allow others to use 
his speech as a platform to amplify their own.  The public-forum doctrine is 
fundamentally unsuited for overseeing Donald Trump’s private choices regarding the 
use of his personal Twitter account. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This appeal arises from the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment 
against the defendants on the basis of stipulated facts.  This Court reviews a grant of 
summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards that govern the district 
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court’s consideration of the motion.  Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 123 (2d 
Cir. 2013).  All questions presented in this appeal are questions of law.  This Court 
reviews questions of law, including questions of constitutional interpretation, de novo.  
United States v. Henry, 888 F.3d 589 (2d Cir. 2018). 
ARGUMENT 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOES NOT CONSTRAIN DONALD TRUMP 
IN BLOCKING OTHER USERS FROM HIS OWN TWITTER ACCOUNT 
The district court’s decision here is an exercise in trying to fit a square peg into 
a round hole.  Contrary to the court’s belief, this case is not about a government 
restriction on access to a public forum.  Donald Trump’s personal Twitter account is 
not a public forum, in whole or in part.  The @realDonaldTrump account belongs to 
and is controlled by Donald Trump, not the federal government, and when he 
chooses to block particular individuals from his personal account, he is exercising 
purely private, rather than governmental, authority—authority that he enjoys in 
common with all Twitter users and that is completely independent of his public office.  
The fundamentally personal character of the account, and the private nature of 
Donald Trump’s authority over it, place his decisions to block users from the account 
beyond the reach of the public-forum doctrine, and indeed, outside the scope of the 
First Amendment altogether.  Moreover, to the extent that blocking prevents 
individuals from replying directly to his tweets, he is merely declining to listen to 
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responses that he does not wish to hear, a choice that is constitutionally 
unobjectionable and that remains so regardless of the content of his tweets.   
A. Donald Trump’s Blocking of Certain Twitter Users from 
@realDonaldTrump Is Private Action Concerning a 
Personal Account and Thus Outside the First Amendment’s 
Ambit   
The First Amendment protects individuals against abridgments of their speech 
by the government, not against restrictions attributable to private actions.  See, e.g., 
Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2628 n.4 (2014) (“[T]he First Amendment does not 
restrict private conduct.”).  Accordingly, a plaintiff who claims that he has been 
impermissibly excluded from a public forum must show that the putative forum is 
owned or controlled by the government.  West Farms Assocs. v. State Traffic Comm’n, 951 
F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1991).  And the plaintiff’s exclusion from the forum must be 
attributable to the exercise of state, rather than private, authority.  See, e.g., Flagg v. 
Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[A] litigant claiming that 
his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged 
conduct constitutes ‘state action.’”).  Plaintiffs in this case cannot make these 
threshold showings. 
1.  Donald Trump’s personal Twitter account did not become government-
owned or government-controlled property when he became President.  The 
@realDonaldTrump account belongs to Donald Trump in his personal capacity, not 
his official one.  He established and began frequent use of the account in 2009, long 
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before his election and inauguration.  And unlike the official @WhiteHouse and 
@POTUS accounts, over which he may assert control only by virtue of his 
Presidential office, he will retain personal control of the @realDonaldTrump account 
after he leaves office.  In short, the account belongs to him, not to the federal 
government. 
His right to use the account, and the terms on which he may use it, are 
independent of his public office and do not involve any right or privilege conferred 
on him by the Presidency.  His use of @realDonaldTrump is governed exclusively by 
rules established by Twitter.  Twitter is a private company that allows its users the 
ability to participate in its privately-operated social media platform in accordance with 
the features and limitations imposed by its privately-created software and terms of 
service.  Twitter—not the government—controls every aspect of that platform, 
including whether and how people may tweet and how they may interact with each 
other.  It is through Twitter’s authority that users may tweet, reply to tweets, and 
retweet each other’s tweets, and it is Twitter’s authority—not its users’, and certainly 
not the government’s—that determines whether and how its users may decline to 
interact with each other. 
The district court acknowledged that Twitter is a private company and that it 
“maintains control over the @realDonaldTrump account (and all other Twitter 
accounts).”  SPA.43.  However, the court noted that Donald Trump and Daniel 
Scavino exercise control over “various aspects” of the @realDonaldTrump account.  
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Id.  The court went on to hold that this control was “governmental,” thereby 
transforming @realDonaldTrump into a government-controlled account.  Id. 
That holding is fundamentally misconceived.   In characterizing the control 
exercised by Donald Trump (and by Daniel Scavino on his behalf) as “governmental,” 
the court relied on the facts that the @realDonaldTrump account is registered to 
“Donald J. Trump, ‘45th President of the United States of America, Washington, 
D.C.,’” (Stipulation ¶ 35 (A54-A55)), that the President’s tweets are official records 
under the Presidential Records Act, (id. ¶ 40 (A57)), and that tweets on 
@realDonaldTrump have been used in the course of carrying out executive functions, 
such as interacting with foreign leaders or announcing official government business,  
(id. ¶ 38 (A56)).  SPA.43-SPA.44.  None of these facts transforms the 
@realDonaldTrump account into government-controlled property. 
The fact that the web page for the @realDonaldTrump account lists Donald 
Trump’s current public position obviously does not transform that privately-owned 
account into a government-controlled one.  The account is registered to “Donald J. 
Trump”—in contrast to the @POTUS account, which is registered to “President 
Trump.”  Stipulation ¶ 35 (A54-A55).  The further notation on the web page that 
Donald Trump is “45th President of the United States of America” is a factual 
statement, not an assertion of ownership by the government.  It merely records the 
fact that Donald Trump happens to be (and will always be, even after he leaves office) 
the 45th President.  Indeed, Barack Obama’s current, private Twitter page 
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(https://twitter.com/BarackObama) describes him as “Dad, husband, President, 
citizen”; George W. Bush’s current, private Twitter page 
(https://twitter.com/georgewbush_43) describes him as “43rd President of the 
United States”; and Bill Clinton’s current, private Twitter page 
(https://twitter.com/billclinton) describes him as “42nd President of the United 
States.” 
Nor does the fact that Donald Trump uses tweets on @realDonaldTrump to 
make statements concerning the actions and policies of his administration transform 
the account as a whole into government-controlled property, much less transform his 
decisions about whom to block into exercises of governmental authority.  He tweeted 
about public affairs even before becoming President, and since assuming the 
Presidency, he has continued to use @realDonaldTrump to discuss matters unrelated 
to government business, including purely personal topics.  Stipulation ¶ 32 (A54); see, 
e.g., A77 (“Congratulations to Eric & Lara on the birth of their son, Eric ‘Luke’ 
Trump this morning! https://t.co/Aw0AV82XdE”), A82 (“A great book by a great 
guy, highly recommended! https://t.co/3jbDDN8YmJ”), A98 (“Will be at the 
Women’s U.S. Open Today!”), A122 (“Happy Easter to everyone!”).  The fact that he 
also uses the account to discuss official matters does not turn it into a government 
account.  Presidents retain personal ownership and control over property that they 
acquired prior to their inauguration.  A President’s private residence does not become 
government property when the President issues public statements or conducts official 
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business there.  So too, Donald Trump’s decision to tweet about official matters 
cannot transform his private Twitter account, which he uses as a platform to 
disseminate his views on a wide range of topics, into a government-controlled forum.  
Cf. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 569 (1972) (“[P]roperty [does not] lose its 
private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated 
purposes.”). 
The district court’s suggestion that @realDonaldTrump is controlled by the 
federal government is particularly misconceived with respect to the specific aspect of 
that account that is at the heart of this case—the capacity of other Twitter users to 
reply to Donald Trump’s tweets, a capability that the court characterized as an 
“interactive space.”  The only control over that “space” available to Donald Trump is 
Twitter’s blocking function, a function that is available to all Twitter users.  As starkly 
confirmed by the fact that he will have control over whether the individual plaintiffs 
are blocked from that same exact “space” even after he himself is no longer 
President—including for the tweets about official matters on his timeline from the 
period of his Presidency—Donald Trump’s use of the Twitter blocking function does 
not make that space government controlled.2 
                                                 
2 The blocking of the individual plaintiffs was performed by Donald Trump 
himself, not by Daniel Scavino.  See Stipulation ¶ 53 (A62) (“[T]he President blocked 
each of the individual plaintiffs”); SPA.25 (“[T]he record is devoid of any suggestion 
that [Scavino] blocked the individual plaintiffs.”). 
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2.  Having concluded that the @realDonaldTrump account was government-
controlled property, the district court declined to engage in a separate analysis of 
whether Donald Trump’s blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the 
@realDonaldTrump account involved state action.  The court regarded government 
control of the account as sufficient to turn the act of excluding users from the 
account into state action.  SPA.45-46 (“As the Second Circuit has recently explained, 
‘[b]ecause facilities or locations deemed to be public forums are usually operated by 
governments, determining that a particular facility or location is a public forum usually 
suffices to render the challenged action taken there to be state action subject to First 
Amendment limitations.” (quoting Halleck v. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 
300, 306-07 (2d Cir. 2018))).  The district court recognized that “further analysis may 
be necessary when the party exercising control over the forum is a nongovernmental 
entity,” SPA.46, but failed to recognize another key circumstance in which the First 
Amendment would not be implicated:  when a forum is government controlled, but 
the person trying to exclude someone from that forum cannot fairly be said to be a 
state actor.    
For the reasons already given, the district court was wrong to think that the 
@realDonaldTrump account is controlled by the federal government.  But even if the 
account were deemed to be government controlled, it would not necessarily (and in 
fact does not) follow that Donald Trump’s blocking of other Twitter users involves 
state action.  State action requires a showing both (1) that “the party charged with the 
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deprivation . . . may fairly be said to be a state actor,” and (2) that the deprivation was 
“caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of 
conduct imposed by the State.”  Flagg, 396 F.3d at 186; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 
42, 48 (1988) (explaining that state action requires that the public official’s conduct 
was “made possible only because [the official] is clothed with the authority of [federal] 
law”) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941))); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil 
Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (“[T]he deprivation must be caused by the exercise of 
some right or privilege created by the State.”).  
Particularly where “government-controlled” property is also subject to control 
by private parties, or by parties exercising private rather than governmental authority, 
exclusion from the property can fail this test.  For example, Twitter, by virtue of its 
control over its social media platform, may choose to ban particular accounts that 
have violated its terms of service, including any terms of service that may draw 
viewpoint- or content-based distinctions.  In doing so, Twitter disables the banned 
account holder from replying to other users’ tweets, including @realDonaldTrump 
tweets.  But even assuming, as the district court erroneously did, that the “interactive 
space” associated with those tweets is government-controlled property, Twitter is not 
exercising any governmental authority when it bans a user, and the resulting exclusion 
of the user from that “space” does not involve any state action.  
 The same is true where, as here, a public official exercises control over his own 
property using means that were available to him prior to assuming office and are not 
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dependent on that office.  Such actions do not involve “the exercise of some right or 
privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state.”  Flagg, 396 
F.3d at 186.  Instead, they are among the wide range of conduct that courts have 
considered to be within “the ambit of [the official’s] personal pursuits” and “plainly 
excluded” from being considered state action.  Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545, 548 (2d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting Screws v. United States¸325 U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (plurality)); see also, 
e.g., Zherka v. DiFiore, 412 F. App’x 345, 347 (2d Cir. 2011) (district attorney’s 
telephone call to newspaper complaining about an article not state action); Colombo v. 
O’Connell, 310 F.3d 115, 118 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (school superintendent’s 
letter, written by a private lawyer, threatening to file libel suit not state action); Monsky 
v. Moraghan, 127 F.3d 243, 245 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[S]ome actions by a judge are taken 
without any relationship to the judge’s office or authority, and are therefore not taken 
under color of law.”); Federer v. Gephardt, 363 F.3d 754, 759 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Federer 
asserts that he has alleged state action because he alleged that Mr. Gephardt was a 
member of the United States House of Representatives . . . . However, a defendant’s 
employment does not make the defendant a governmental actor for all purposes.  The 
particular action complained of must be fairly attributable to the respective 
government.”). 
 Here, Donald Trump’s blocking of the individual plaintiffs from his 
@realDonaldTrump account does not remotely qualify as state action.  As already 
discussed, Twitter is a private social media platform created and operated by a private 
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company.  Twitter, not the government, created the block function and determined 
what the consequences of using that function would be.  And Twitter has provided all 
of its users with the ability to exercise the block function.  Donald Trump’s use of the 
block function on the @realDonaldTrump account is thus not dependent on any 
privilege granted to or enjoyed by him by virtue of his current office; it is a choice that 
is available to any “ordinary citizen[]” and therefore not attributable to the 
government.  Monsky, 127 F.3d at 246.  Again, this is confirmed by the fact that 
Donald Trump enjoyed the ability to block users from the @realDonaldTrump 
account before he assumed office, and that he will continue to have that ability after 
he leaves.3 
The district court acknowledged that blocking “is a capability held by every 
Twitter user,” but reasoned that “the power to exclude is also one afforded generally 
to every property owner,” yet government property remains subject to the reach of 
the public-forum doctrine.  SPA.47-SPA.48.  When property belongs to the govern-
ment, however, an authorized official’s decision to exclude involves an exercise of the 
government’s own authority.  Here, what is critical is not simply that Twitter has 
conferred the right to block on all Twitter account holders, private as well as public; it 
                                                 
3 That result is not altered by the fact that the decision to block particular 
plaintiffs may have been prompted by their responses to tweets about official matters.  
See, e.g., Colombo, 310 F.3d at 118 (private threat by local official to sue over criticism 
of official’s public acts was not state action because official’s ability to sue was not 
possessed by virtue of state law). 
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is that when Donald Trump blocks users from his personal Twitter account, the right 
to block belongs to him as a private account holder, independent of his public office. 
As a result, the fact that Donald Trump is President does not suffice to 
transform his control over other users’ interactions with @realDonaldTrump into 
governmental action.  Again, public officials retain their rights of private ownership 
over their property after their assumption of office, and they similarly retain the ability 
to restrict access to that property in their private capacity.  It is beyond serious 
dispute, for example, that George W. Bush could have, without violating the First 
Amendment, held a massive town-hall-style debate on his Crawford ranch that was 
generally open to the public but closed to particularly vehement critics of his 
Presidency, and similarly, could have freely chosen which audience members to take 
questions from.  That type of private decision regarding the use of his own personal 
property would not have been subject to constitutional scrutiny if performed during 
the 2000 election campaign, and it would not have radically transformed into a 
governmental decision subject to First Amendment constraints if it were performed 
during the 2004 re-election campaign. 
So too here. When Donald Trump chose to block the individual plaintiffs from 
his personal account, he was employing a capability in common with all other users of 
private Twitter accounts—a capability that did not depend on his status as President, 
that he would enjoy even if he did not hold any governmental office, and that he will 
continue to enjoy once he no longer holds any governmental office.  The First 
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Amendment simply does not apply to his private choices about excluding others from 
his personal Twitter account. 
B. @realDonaldTrump Is a Vehicle for Disseminating Donald 
Trump’s Own Speech, Not a Forum Designed to Facilitate 
the Speech of Others 
The district court’s failure to recognize the private nature of Donald Trump’s 
personal Twitter account and the private character of his action in blocking other 
Twitter users from the account is enough by itself to require reversal.  But it is not the 
only dispositive error in the court’s decision.  The decision also rests on the 
fundamentally misconceived premise that @realDonaldTrump is a “forum” intended 
to facilitate the private expression of others. 
To qualify as a public forum to which First Amendment protections apply, it is 
not enough for the property or other space in question to be owned or controlled by 
the government.  In addition, unless the property is a traditional public forum such as 
a public park or street, the government must have intentionally opened up the 
property to provide a place for members of the public to communicate with each 
other.  See Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250 
(2015) (“[The] government ‘does not create a public forum by inaction or by 
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum 
for public discourse.’” (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 802 (1985)); Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2001) (“A 
designated public forum is created by purposeful governmental action—that is, when 
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the government ‘intentionally open[s] a nontraditional forum for public discourse.’”) 
(alteration in original); see also West Farms Assocs., 951 F.2d at 473.  If this element is 
lacking, the public forum doctrine and its attendant First Amendment protections do 
not apply.  See, e.g., United States v. American Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003) 
(plurality op.) (declining to apply forum analysis to the installation of internet filtering 
software at public libraries because “[a] public library does not acquire Internet 
terminals in order to create a public forum for Web publishers to express 
themselves”).   
Courts must be cautious in determining that a new medium for expressive 
conduct satisfies this requirement.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that 
“the public forum doctrine should not be extended in a mechanical way” to contexts 
that are “very different” from the “streets and parks” where the doctrine first arose.  
Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 672-73 (1998); see also Denver 
Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749 (1996) (“[W]e are wary 
of the notion that a partial analogy in one context, for which [courts] have developed 
doctrines, can compel a full range of decisions in . . .  new and changing area[s].”).  
Here, the @realDonaldTrump account does not constitute a public forum, in whole 
or in part.  The object of the account is not to provide the public with a venue to 
communicate with and about Donald Trump, but rather to provide Donald Trump 
with a tool to express his own views and convey them to other Twitter users and the 
world at large. 
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1.  From the time that Donald Trump first created his personal Twitter account 
in 2009, @realDonaldTrump has served as a platform for him to engage in his own 
speech and convey his own thoughts to a large and ever-growing audience.  That 
purpose has not changed since he became President.  He continues to use his account 
as a vehicle to disseminate his own speech, not as a place for the private expression of 
others.  See, e.g., Stipulation ¶ 37 (A55-A56) (“Dan Scavino, has, on at least one 
occasion, promoted @realDonaldTrump . . . as [a] channel[ ] through which 
‘President Donald J. Trump . . . [c]ommunicat[es] directly with you, the American 
people!”) (fourth and fifth alterations in original).  To the extent that these tweets are, 
as the district court concluded, “governmental” in nature, they are government speech 
to which the First Amendment in general, and the public-forum doctrine in particular, 
do not apply.  SPA.52 (“Government speech is one category of speech that falls 
outside the domain of forum analysis.”); see Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250 (“First 
Amendment strictures that attend the various types of government-established 
forums do not apply” to government speech.); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 
460, 467 (2009) (“The Free Speech Clause . . . does not regulate government 
speech.”). 
The district court itself recognized that Donald Trump’s own tweets are not 
part of a public forum.  See SPA.54 (“Based on the government speech doctrine, we 
reject out of hand any contention that the content of the President’s tweets are 
susceptible to forum analysis.”)   But it failed to appreciate the full significance of that 
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fact.  Donald Trump’s tweets are the whole raison d’etre of his personal Twitter 
account.  The heart of the @realDonaldTrump account are the tweets posted by 
Donald Trump (or, on occasion, by Daniel Scavino on his behalf) expressing Donald 
Trump’s own views.  The “intended purpose” of the account (Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672-
73) was not to provide an opportunity for other Twitter users to communicate to or 
about Donald Trump, but rather to provide him with an opportunity to communicate 
to them. 
 To be sure, Twitter’s terms and conditions allow its users to interact with each 
other in a variety of ways, including by replying to or retweeting another user’s tweet.  
Twitter allows multiple overlapping exchanges between individuals; for example, one 
user may tweet, a second may reply to the tweet, a third may reply to that reply, a 
fourth may retweet the exchange, and a fifth may choose to block the original tweeter, 
as an expression of disapproval.  To the extent that Twitter provides the means for 
conversations among its many users, Twitter as a whole could be characterized as a 
private forum for public expression—though not a “public forum” in the First 
Amendment sense, given its non-governmental character.  But individual Twitter 
accounts like @realDonaldTrump are not themselves public forums, in the First 
Amendment or any other sense.  They are merely the mechanism through which 
individuals can express their own views and engage—or decline to engage—with 
other Twitter users as they wish.  The @realDonaldTrump account permits Donald 
Trump to participate on Twitter by posting messages, reading others’ messages, and 
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interacting—or choosing not to interact—with others in response to those messages.  
But that does not make the account itself a “forum,” public or otherwise. 
 2.  When Donald Trump posts a tweet on @realDonaldTrump, that message is 
viewable by other Twitter users (and indeed by anyone with a Web browser).  
Twitter’s reply function enables other Twitter users to directly respond to that 
message and to notify @realDonaldTrump that they have done so. 
The district court treated as a “public forum” under the First Amendment the 
capability of Twitter users to reply to Donald Trump’s tweets—which it characterized 
as the “interactive space” beneath such a tweet.  This reasoning is doubly flawed.  
First, the court’s “interactive space” jargon confuses rather than advances the First 
Amendment analysis.  When one individual replies to another in the physical world, 
no one would think the ability to reply is itself a “forum.”  If the reply happens to be 
offered in a public forum, restrictions by the government on the right to reply are 
subject to the First Amendment.  But if the location of the reply does not meet the 
requirements for a public forum, there can be no bootstrapping into First 
Amendment protection merely by applying the “forum” label to the reply itself.  
Second, in any event, the fact that Twitter gives users the capability to reply to Donald 
Trump’s tweets does not mean that he (let alone the government) “intentionally 
open[ed]” @realDonaldTrump as a venue “for public discourse” rather than as a 
platform to talk to the public, Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2250. 
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Twitter enables account users to customize their interactions with each other in 
a variety of ways, some of which are analogous to ways that speakers may interact in 
physical settings.  Blocking is one such feature.  Twitter’s website describes 
“blocking” as a “feature that helps you control how you interact with other accounts 
on Twitter.”  How to block accounts on Twitter, Twitter 
https://support.twitter.com/articles/117063 (last visited July 24, 2018) (emphasis 
added).  Blocking provides a user with a way to ignore another speaker whom the 
blocking user does not wish to hear.  And blocking may itself serve as a form of 
expression, conveying disapproval of the blocked user. 
When individual users are blocked from the @realDonaldTrump account, they 
remain free to participate in the broad exchange of information and ideas on Twitter.  
The blocked plaintiffs can, and do, continue to tweet about the current Administra-
tion’s policies and to criticize President Trump’s agenda through their own accounts 
on Twitter.  They can read Donald Trump’s tweets (other than directly through their 
blocked accounts), and they can respond to his tweets by posting responsive tweets 
on their own Twitter pages.  They may mention the @realDonaldTrump account in 
their tweets, reproduce screenshots of Donald Trump’s tweets in their own tweets, 
and engage with other Twitter users who are discussing the content of 
@realDonaldTrump tweets, including those who have replied to or retweeted 
@realDonaldTrump tweets.  Indeed, several of the individual plaintiffs have 
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participated in conversations that originated with other users’ replies to 
@realDonaldTrump tweets.  Stipulation ¶¶ 57-58 (A64-A66). 
Accordingly, the only material impact that blocking has on the individual 
plaintiffs’ ability to express themselves on Twitter is that it prevents them from 
speaking directly to Donald Trump by replying to his tweets on the 
@realDonaldTrump web page.  See SPA.58, SPA.60-SPA.61.  But that impact does 
not implicate the First Amendment.  As the Supreme Court has made clear, “[a] 
person’s right to speak is not infringed when the government simply ignores that 
person while listening to others.”  Minnesota State Bd. For Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 
271, 288 (1984).  The First Amendment does not limit public officials’ ability to 
choose with whom they wish to speak and to whom they wish to listen.  Id. at 283, 
288 (“Appellees have no constitutional right to force the government to listen to their 
views.”).  Thus, an official can turn away from a critic whom he encounters on the 
street, or choose not to engage with a hostile individual in a public place.  When 
Donald Trump chooses to block a particular user from @realDonaldTrump, he is 
exercising the same prerogative.  Neither the public-forum doctrine nor any other 
First Amendment principle obligates him to entertain replies on his own Twitter page 
from users from whom he does not wish to hear. 
The district court faulted Donald Trump’s recourse to blocking, rather than 
muting, as a means of declining to engage with particular Twitter users, because 
blocking has a different impact on the potential reach of the blocked user’s tweets.  
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SPA.65-SPA.67.  The court noted that “[t]he audience for a reply extends more 
broadly than the sender of the tweet being replied to,” SPA.67, because other persons 
who view the original tweet can, at least in principle, see the reply by clicking on the 
original tweet.4  As a result, a reply on @realDonaldTrump may be seen by more 
persons than a freestanding responsive tweet that appears only on the blocked user’s 
Twitter page.  In contrast to muting, blocking prevents the blocked user from posting 
a reply that is visible to other users who are viewing Donald Trump’s tweets. 
But there is nothing constitutionally problematic about that result.  Given the 
size of Donald Trump’s Twitter audience, it may well be that another user’s words will 
be seen by more people if he can display them on Donald Trump’s web page.  But 
just as the First Amendment does not give anyone the right to compel a public official 
to listen to their speech, neither it does entitle anyone to piggyback on the govern-
ment’s speech as a way to amplify their own.  See Knight, 465 U.S. at 288 (explaining 
that it is “doubtless true” that the government’s choice to listen to some speakers and 
not others may “amplif[y]” some voices over others, and nevertheless concluding that 
such decisions do not infringe speech).   
By way of physical analogy, suppose that a President gives a speech before a 
large audience in an auditorium, and then entertains questions and comments from 
                                                 
4 The visibility of a reply depends in part on the number of replies that the 
tweet receives.  If a tweet receives a large volume of replies, a given reply may be lost 
from view as a practical matter.  A typical tweet by Donald Trump generates 
thousands of replies.  Stipulation ¶ 41 (A57-A58). 
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the audience after his remarks.  He chooses to pass over one member of the audience 
who has previously made hostile remarks.  While the passed-over member remains 
free to say whatever he wants outside the auditorium, the President’s decision not to 
hear from him effectively denies the individual the opportunity to be heard by the 
President’s large audience within.  Yet no one would seriously suggest that the 
audience member’s constitutional rights have been violated or that the First 
Amendment obligates the President to call on him.  The First Amendment entitles 
him to speak; it does not entitle him to borrow the President’s audience for his 
remarks.  And again, this is especially true if the auditorium is the President’s personal 
property, over which he retains a private, not governmental, right to exclude.   
So too here.  A Twitter user might garner more attention with a reply tweet that 
is sent directly to @realDonaldTrump than with an identical tweet on his own 
account or a reply tweet sent to another Twitter user with a smaller following.  But 
blocking the user does not prevent him from speaking; it merely limits his access to 
Donald Trump’s own audience on @realDonaldTrump.  That is not a denial of access 
to a public forum, and it does not offend the First Amendment. 
In short, regardless of whether the @realDonaldTrump account is viewed in its 
entirety or disaggregated into judicially manufactured “spaces,” it does not bear a 
meaningful resemblance to a public forum, and it is wholly unsuited for the applica-
tion of traditional public-forum principles.  It is now, as it has been since its creation, 
a vehicle to facilitate Donald Trump’s own speech, not a platform to facilitate or 
Case 18-1691, Document 25, 08/07/2018, 2362018, Page43 of 124
38 
 
amplify the speech of others.  As such, public forum analysis is not “compatible with 
the intended purpose of the property.”  Forbes, 523 U.S. at 673 (quoting Perry Educ. 
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)).  When Donald Trump 
makes decisions about how to interact with other Twitter users, he is acting as a 
participant in the marketplace of ideas, not a regulator of the marketplace.  Cf. Reeves, 
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-37 (1980) (“The basic distinction . . . between States as 
market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound 
law.”).  And when he chooses to block other Twitter users from his personal account, 
he is declining to communicate with them or allow them to communicate with others 
through him, but he is not preventing them from participating in expressive conduct 
on Twitter.  For this reason, as well as the lack of governmental control or action, 
there is no basis for the district court’s conclusion that Donald Trump’s decision to 
block the individual plaintiffs from the @realDonaldTrump account is an 
unconstitutional restriction on access to a public forum. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment in part for plaintiffs should be 
reversed. 
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This case requires us to consider whether a public official 
may, consistent with the First Amendment, “block” a person from 
his Twitter account in response to the political views that person 
has expressed, and whether the analysis differs because that public 
official is the President of the United States.  The answer to 
both questions is no. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows.  We first set forth the 
background facts regarding Twitter as a platform, the 
@realDonaldTrump account that is the center of this dispute, the 
plaintiffs, and this case’s procedural history.  Because 
defendants object to our adjudication of this case based on 
plaintiffs’ lack of standing, we then turn -- as we must -- to the 
consideration of those jurisdictional arguments.  We conclude that 
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the plaintiffs have established the prerequisites to our 
jurisdiction: they have experienced a legally cognizable injury, 
those injuries are traceable to the President and Daniel Scavino’s 
conduct, and a favorable judicial decision on the merits is likely 
to redress those injuries. 
We then proceed to the substance of plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment claims.  We hold that portions of the @realDonaldTrump 
account -- the “interactive space” where Twitter users may directly 
engage with the content of the President’s tweets -- are properly 
analyzed under the “public forum” doctrines set forth by the 
Supreme Court, that such space is a designated public forum, and 
that the blocking of the plaintiffs based on their political speech 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination that violates the First 
Amendment.  In so holding, we reject the defendants’ contentions 
that the First Amendment does not apply in this case and that the 
President’s personal First Amendment interests supersede those of 
plaintiffs. 
Finally, we consider what form of relief should be awarded, 
as plaintiffs seek both declaratory relief and injunctive relief.  
While we reject defendants’ categorical assertion that injunctive 
relief cannot ever be awarded against the President, we nonetheless 
conclude that it is unnecessary to enter that legal thicket at 
this time.  A declaratory judgment should be sufficient, as no 
government official -- including the President -- is above the 
Case 1:17-cv-05205-NRB   Document 72   Filed 05/23/18   Page 2 of 75
SPA.2
Case 18-1691, Document 25, 08/07/2018, 2362018, Page51 of 124
3 
law, and all government officials are presumed to follow the law 
as has been declared. 
I. Background 
The facts presented below are drawn almost entirely from the 
stipulation of facts between the parties, see Stipulation, Sept. 
28, 2017, ECF No. 30-1, which “applies exclusively to this 
litigation and does not constitute an admission for purposes of 
any other proceeding,” Stip. at 1.1 
A. The Twitter Platform 
“Twitter is a social media platform with more than 300 million 
active users worldwide, including some 70 million in the United 
States.”  Stip. ¶ 13.  A “‘user’ is an individual who has created 
an account on the platform.”  Stip. ¶ 14.  “A Twitter user must 
have an account name, which is an @ symbol followed by a unique 
identifier (e.g., @realDonaldTrump), and a descriptive name (e.g., 
Donald J. Trump).  The account name is called the user’s ‘handle.’”  
Stip. ¶ 16. 
Twitter “allows users to post short messages,” Stip. ¶ 13, 
which are called “tweets,” Stip. ¶ 14.  Tweets may be “up to [280] 
characters in length,”2 may “include photographs, videos, and 
                     
1 We appreciate the parties’ professional response to our suggestion that 
they stipulate to the underlying facts so that the legal issues presented by 
this dispute could be addressed without the need to undertake a lengthy 
discovery process. 
2 At the time of the parties’ stipulation, most users were limited to 140 
characters per tweet.  The limit has since been increased to 280 characters.  
See Aliza Rosen, Tweeting Made Easier, Twitter (Nov. 7, 2017), https://blog 
.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/product/2017/tweetingmadeeasier.html. 
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links,” and are posted “to a webpage on Twitter that is attached 
to the user’s account.”  Stip. ¶ 14.  “An individual ‘tweet’ 
comprises the tweeted content (i.e., the message, including any 
embedded photograph, video, or link), the user’s account name (with 
a link to the user’s Twitter webpage), the user’s profile picture, 
the date and time the tweet was generated, and the number of times 
the tweet has been replied to . . . , retweeted by . . . , or liked 
by . . . other users.”  Stip. ¶ 17. 
The Twitter webpage that displays the collection of a user’s 
tweets is known as the user’s “timeline.”  Stip. ¶ 15.  “When a 
user generates a tweet, the timeline updates immediately to include 
that tweet,” and “[a]nyone who can view a user’s Twitter webpage 
can see the user’s timeline.”  Stip. ¶ 15.  “A user’s Twitter 
webpage may also include a short biographical description; a 
profile picture, such as a headshot; a ‘header’ image, which 
appears as a banner at the top of the webpage; the user’s location; 
a button labeled ‘Message,’ which allows two users to correspond 
privately; and a small sample of photographs and videos posted to 
the user’s timeline, which link to a full gallery.”  Stip. ¶ 16.  
“By default, Twitter webpages and their associated timelines are 
visible to everyone with internet access, including those who are 
not Twitter users.  However, although non-users can view users’ 
Twitter webpages (if the accounts are public), they cannot interact 
with users on the Twitter platform.”  Stip. ¶ 18. 
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A defining feature of Twitter is a user’s ability “to repost 
or respond to others’ messages, and to interact with other Twitter 
users in relation to those messages.”  Stip. ¶ 13.  “Beyond posting 
tweets . . . , Twitter users can engage with one another in a 
variety of ways.”  Stip. ¶ 21.  First, “they can ‘retweet’ -- i.e., 
repost -- the tweets of other users, either by posting them 
directly to their own followers or by ‘quoting’ them in their own 
tweets.  When a user retweets a tweet, it appears on the user’s 
timeline in the same form as it did on the original user’s 
timeline, but with a notation indicating that the post was 
retweeted.”  Stip. ¶ 21.  Second, “[a] Twitter user can also reply 
to other users’ tweets.  Like any other tweet, a reply can be up 
to [280] characters in length and can include photographs, videos, 
and links.”  Stip. ¶ 22.  This reply may be viewed in two places: 
when a user sends a reply, “the reply appears on the user’s 
timeline under a tab labeled ‘Tweets & replies.’”  However, the 
reply may also be accessed from the feed of the user sending the 
tweet being replied to: “by clicking on the tweet that prompted 
the reply[,] the reply will appear below the original tweet, along 
with other users’ replies to the same tweet.”  Stip. ¶ 22.  Third, 
“[a] Twitter user can also ‘favorite’ or ‘like’ another user’s 
tweet by clicking on the heart icon that appears under the tweet.  
By ‘liking’ a tweet, a user may mean to convey approval or to 
acknowledge having seen the tweet.”  Stip. ¶ 24.  Fourth, “[a] 
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Twitter user can also ‘mention’ another user by including the other 
user’s Twitter handle in a tweet.  A Twitter user mentioned by 
another user will receive a ‘notification’ that he or she has been 
mentioned in another user’s tweet.”  Stip. ¶ 25.  Finally, “Twitter 
users can subscribe to other users’ messages by ‘following’ those 
users’ accounts. Users generally can see all tweets posted or 
retweeted by accounts they have followed.”  Stip. ¶ 19. “Tweets, 
retweets, replies, likes, and mentions are controlled by the user 
who generates them.  No other Twitter user can alter the content 
of any retweet or reply, either before or after it is posted.  
Twitter users cannot prescreen tweets, replies, likes, or mentions 
that reference their tweets or accounts.”  Stip. ¶ 26. 
Because a retweet or a reply to a tweet is itself a tweet, 
each retweet and reply, recursively, may be retweeted, replied to, 
or liked.  “A Twitter user can also reply to other replies.  A 
user whose tweet generates replies will see the replies below his 
or her original tweet, with any replies-to-replies nested below 
the replies to which they respond.  The collection of replies and 
replies-to-replies is sometimes referred to as a ‘comment 
thread.’”  Stip. ¶ 23.  “Twitter is called a ‘social’ media 
platform in large part because of comment threads, which reflect 
multiple overlapping ‘conversations’ among and across groups of 
users.”  Stip. ¶ 23. 
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In addition to these means of interaction, Twitter offers two 
means of limiting interaction with other users: blocking and 
muting.  First, “[a] user who wants to prevent another user from 
interacting with her account on the Twitter platform can do so by 
‘blocking’ that user.  (Twitter provides users with the capability 
to block other users, but it is the users themselves who decide 
whether to make use of this capability.)  When a user is signed in 
to a Twitter account that has been blocked, the blocked user cannot 
see or reply to the blocking user’s tweets, view the blocking 
user’s list of followers or followed accounts, or use the Twitter 
platform to search for the blocking user’s tweets.  The blocking 
user will not be notified if the blocked user mentions her or posts 
a tweet; nor, when signed in to her account, will the blocking 
user see any tweets posted by the blocked user.”  Stip. ¶ 28.  “If, 
while signed in to the blocked account, the blocked user attempts 
to follow the blocking user, or to access the Twitter webpage from 
which the user is blocked, the blocked user will see a message 
indicating that the other user has blocked him or her from 
following the account and viewing the tweets associated with the 
account.”  Stip. ¶ 29. 
While blocking precludes the blocked user from directly 
interacting with the blocking user’s tweets -- including from 
replying or retweeting those tweets, blocking does not eliminate 
all interaction between the blocked user and the blocking user.  
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“After a user has been blocked, the blocked user can still mention 
the blocking user.  Tweets mentioning the blocking user will be 
visible to anyone who can view the blocked user’s tweets and 
replies.  A blocked user can also reply to users who have replied 
to the blocking user’s tweets, although the blocked user cannot 
see the tweet by the blocking user that prompted the original 
reply.  These replies-to-replies will appear in the comment thread, 
beneath the reply to the blocking user’s original tweet.”  Stip. 
¶ 30.  Further, “[i]f a blocked user is not signed in to Twitter, 
he or she can view all of the content on Twitter that is accessible 
to anyone without a Twitter account.”  Stip. ¶ 31. 
As distinguished from blocking, “[m]ut[ing] is a feature that 
allows [a user] to remove an account's Tweets from [his or her] 
timeline without unfollowing or blocking that account.  Muted 
accounts will not know that [the muting user has] muted them and 
[the muting user] can unmute them at any time.”  How to Mute 
Accounts on Twitter, Twitter (last visited May 22, 2018), https:// 
help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/twitter-mute [hereinafter How 
to Mute].3  “Muted accounts can follow [the muting user] and [the 
muting user] can follow muted accounts.  Muting an account will 
not cause [the muting user] to unfollow them.”  Id.  If a muting 
user follows a muted user, “[r]eplies and mentions by the muted 
                     
3 The parties agree that we “may take judicial notice of the information 
published in the ‘Using Twitter’ and ‘Policies and reporting’ guides available 
on Twitter’s ‘Twitter Support’ webpage.”  Stip. at 3 n.2. 
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account will still appear in [the muting user’s] Notifications 
tab,” and “[w]hen [the muting user] click[s] or tap[s] into a 
conversation, replies from muted accounts will be visible.”  Id.  
By contrast, if a muting user does not follow a muted user, 
“[r]eplies and mentions will not appear in [the muting user’s] 
Notifications tab,” and “[w]hen [the muting user] click[s] or 
tap[s] into a conversation, replies from muted accounts will be 
not visible.”  Id. 
B. The @realDonaldTrump Account 
“Donald Trump established @realDonaldTrump in March 2009. 
Before his inauguration, he used this account to tweet about a 
variety of topics, including popular culture and politics.  Since 
his inauguration in January 2017, President Trump has used the 
@realDonaldTrump account as a channel for communicating and 
interacting with the public about his administration.  He also has 
continued to use the account, on occasion, to communicate about 
other issues not directly related to official government 
business.”  Stip. ¶ 32.  “The Twitter page associated with the 
account is registered to Donald J. Trump, ‘45th President of the 
United States of America, Washington, D.C.’”  Stip. ¶ 35.  “The 
@realDonaldTrump account is generally accessible to the public at 
large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting 
criteria.”  Stip. ¶ 36.  “[A]ny member of the public can view his 
tweets without being signed in to Twitter, and anyone who wants to 
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follow the account can do so.  President Trump has not issued any 
rule or statement purporting to limit (by form or subject matter) 
the speech of those who reply to his tweets.”  Stip. ¶ 36. 
Since the President’s inauguration, the @realDonaldTrump 
account has been operated with the assistance of defendant Daniel 
Scavino, “the White House Social Media Director and Assistant to 
the President [who] is sued in his official capacity only.”  Stip. 
¶ 12.  “With the assistance of Mr. Scavino in certain instances, 
President Trump uses @realDonaldTrump, often multiple times a day, 
to announce, describe, and defend his policies; to promote his 
Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official 
decisions; to engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize 
state visits; to challenge media organizations whose coverage of 
his Administration he believes to be unfair; and for other 
statements, including on occasion statements unrelated to official 
government business.  President Trump sometimes uses the account 
to announce matters related to official government business before 
those matters are announced to the public through other official 
channels.”  Stip. ¶ 38.  “For example, the President used 
@realDonaldTrump to announce on June 7, 2017, for the first time, 
that he intended to nominate Christopher Wray for the position of 
FBI director.”  Stip. ¶ 38.  Since the parties’ stipulation, the 
President has also used the @realDonaldTrump account in removing 
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then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson4 and then-Secretary of 
Veterans Affairs David Shulkin.5  Additionally, “[t]he National 
Archives and Records Administration has advised the White House 
that the President’s tweets from @realDonaldTrump . . . are 
official records that must be preserved under the Presidential 
Records Act.”  Stip. ¶ 40. 
“Mr. Scavino in certain instances assists President Trump in 
operating the @realDonaldTrump account, including by drafting and 
posting tweets to the account.  Other White House aides besides 
Mr. Scavino will, in certain instances, also suggest content for 
@realDonaldTrump tweets.  President Trump also sometimes dictates 
tweets to Mr. Scavino, who then posts them on Twitter.  President 
Trump and/or Mr. Scavino sometimes retweet the tweets of those who 
participate in comment threads associated with the 
@realDonaldTrump account.”  Stip. ¶ 39.  “Mr. Scavino has access 
to the @realDonaldTrump account, including the access necessary to 
block and unblock individuals from the @realDonaldTrump account,” 
Stip. ¶ 12, and has explained that @realDonaldTrump is a channel 
“through which ‘President Donald J. Trump . . . [c]ommunicat[es] 
                     
4 Michael C. Bender & Felicia Schwartz, Rex Tillerson Is out as Secretary 
of State; Donald Trump Taps Mike Pompeo, Wall St. J. (Mar. 13, 2018, 7:20 P.M.), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/rex-tillerson-is-out-as-secretary-of-state 
-donald-trump-taps-mike-pompeo-1520978116. 
5 Donovan Slack, Veterans Affairs Secretary David Shulkin Is Out, Trump 
Announces by Tweet, USA Today (Mar. 28, 2018, 8:46 P.M.), https://www.usatoday 
.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/28/david-shulkin-veterans-affairs-secretary 
-forced-out-john-kelly/346741002/. 
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directly with you, the American people!’”  Stip. ¶ 37 (alterations 
and omissions in original). 
Twitter users engage frequently with the President’s tweets.  
“Typically, tweets from @realDonaldTrump generate thousands of 
replies from members of the public, and some of those replies 
generate hundreds or thousands of replies in turn.”  Stip. ¶ 41.  
“For example, on July 26, 2017, President Trump issued a series of 
tweets . . . announcing ‘that the United States Government will 
not accept or allow . . . Transgender individuals to serve’ in the 
military, and after less than three hours, the three tweets, 
collectively, had been retweeted nearly 70,000 times, liked nearly 
180,000 times, and replied to about 66,000 times.”  Stip. ¶ 41 
(second omission in original).  “This level of engagement is 
typical for President Trump’s tweets,” Stip. ¶ 42, which 
“frequently receive 15,000–20,000 retweets or more,” Stip. ¶ 42, 
and “are each replied to tens of thousands of times,” Stip. ¶ 43. 
C. The Individual Plaintiffs 
Rebecca Buckwalter, Philip Cohen, Holly Figueroa, Eugene Gu, 
Brandon Neely, Joseph Papp, and Nicholas Pappas (collectively, the 
“individual plaintiffs”), are all Twitter users.  Stip. ¶¶ 2-8.  
They each tweeted a message critical of the President or his 
policies in reply to a tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account.  
Stip. ¶¶ 46-52.  Each individual plaintiff had his or her account 
blocked shortly thereafter, and each account remains blocked.  
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Stip. ¶¶ 46-52.  Defendants do “not contest Plaintiffs’ allegation 
that the Individual Plaintiffs were blocked from the President’s 
Twitter account because the Individual Plaintiffs posted tweets 
that criticized the President or his policies.”  Stip. at 1. 
“As a result of the President’s blocking of the Individual 
Plaintiffs from @realDonaldTrump, the Individual Plaintiffs cannot 
view the President’s tweets; directly reply to these tweets; or use 
the @realDonaldTrump webpage to view the comment threads associated 
with the President’s tweets while they are logged in to their verified 
accounts.”  Stip. ¶ 54.  However, “[t]he Individual Plaintiffs can 
view tweets from @realDonaldTrump when using an internet browser or 
other application that is not logged in to Twitter, or that is logged 
in to a Twitter account that is not blocked by @realDonaldTrump.”  
Stip. ¶ 55.  Additionally, “[s]ome of the Individual Plaintiffs have 
established second accounts so that they can view the President’s 
tweets.”  Stip. ¶ 56. 
Blocking does not completely eliminate the individual 
plaintiffs’ ability to interact with the President’s tweets.  “The 
Individual Plaintiffs can view replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets, 
and can post replies to those replies, while logged in to the 
blocked accounts.  Replies-to-replies appear in the comment 
threads that originate with @realDonaldTrump tweets and are 
visible to users who have not blocked (or been blocked by) the 
Individual Plaintiffs.”  Stip. ¶ 57.  “Although the Individual 
Plaintiffs who have been blocked have the ability to view and reply 
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to replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets, they cannot see the original 
@realDonaldTrump tweets themselves when signed in to their blocked 
accounts, and in many instances it is difficult to understand the 
reply tweets without the context of the original @realDonaldTrump 
tweets.”  Stip. ¶ 58.  While “[i]n the past, Plaintiffs Holly 
Figueroa, Eugene Gu, and Brandon Neely used a third-party service 
called Favstar that could be used by blocked users to view and 
reply to a blocking account’s tweets if the blocked user 
established a Favstar account and followed certain steps[,] [t]he 
parties’ understanding is that it is no longer possible for blocked 
users to use the Favstar service to view and reply to a blocking 
account’s tweets.”  Stip. ¶ 59. 
These workarounds “require [the individual plaintiffs] to take 
more steps than non-blocked, signed-in users to view the President’s 
tweets.”  Stip. ¶ 55.  “All of the Individual Plaintiffs have found 
these various ‘workarounds’ to be burdensome and to delay their 
ability to respond to @realDonaldTrump tweets.  As a result, four 
of the Individual Plaintiffs do not use them and the others use 
them infrequently.”  Stip. ¶ 60. 
D. The Knight Institute 
The “Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University 
is a 501(c)(3) organization that works to defend and strengthen 
the freedoms of speech and the press in the digital age through 
strategic litigation, research, and public education.  Staff at 
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the Knight First Amendment Institute operate a Twitter account 
under the handle @knightcolumbia, and this account follows 
@realDonaldTrump.”  Stip. ¶ 1.  In contrast to the individual 
plaintiffs, “[t]he Knight Institute has not been blocked from the 
@realDonaldTrump account.”  Stip. ¶ 61.  However, “[t]he Knight 
Institute desires to read comments that otherwise would have been 
posted by the blocked Plaintiffs, and by other accounts blocked by 
@realDonaldTrump, in direct reply to @realDonaldTrump tweets,” 
Stip. ¶ 61, and “[t]he @knightcolumbia account follows Professor 
Cohen’s account, @familyunequal,” Stip. ¶ 62.  “As of August 22, 
2017,” however, “the Knight Institute did not follow the other six 
Individual Plaintiffs on Twitter.”  Stip. ¶ 62. 
E. Procedural History 
The Knight Institute and the individual plaintiffs filed suit 
in July 2017, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and naming 
the President, Scavino, and then-White House Press Secretary Sean 
Spicer as defendants.  Compl., July 11, 2017, ECF No. 1.  After 
Spicer’s resignation in late July 2017, his successor as White 
House Press Secretary, Sarah Huckabee Sanders, and White House 
Communications Director Hope Hicks were substituted in his place 
pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6  
                     
6 Hicks has since resigned her position as White House Communications 
Director.  See Katie Rogers & Maggie Haberman, Hope Hicks is Gone, and It’s Not 
Clear Who Can Replace Her, N.Y. Times (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/03/29/us/politics/hope-hicks-white-house.html.  Because plaintiffs seek 
only prospective relief and Hicks was sued only in her official capacity, Stip. 
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See Letter from Jameel Jaffer and Michael H. Baer to the Court, 
Sept. 25, 2017, ECF No. 28.  After entering into the stipulation 
of facts, defendants moved for summary judgment on October 13, 
2017 and plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment on November 
3, 2017.  We heard oral argument on March 8, 2018. 
II. Standing 
Before turning to the merits of this dispute, “we are required 
to assure ourselves of jurisdiction.”  Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Port 
Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 760 F.3d 227, 237 n.11 (2d Cir. 2014).  At 
bottom, the “judicial Power of the United States” is 
constitutionally limited to “Cases” and “Controversies.”   U.S. 
Const. art. III, § 2.  Because “[s]tanding to sue is a doctrine 
rooted in the traditional understanding of a case or controversy,” 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016), “[w]hether 
a claimant has standing is the threshold question in every federal 
case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit,” 
Fair Hous. in Huntington Comm. Inc. v. Town of Huntington, 316 
F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 2003).  “If plaintiffs lack Article III 
standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear their 
claim.”  Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. 
Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005). 
                     
¶ 10, the fact of Hicks’s resignation alone warrants summary judgment in her 
favor.  Further, because the President has not yet appointed Hicks’s successor, 
no substitution by operation of Rule 25(d) can occur.  Hicks will therefore be 
dismissed as a defendant, and no one will be substituted in her stead at this 
time.  The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption of this case 
accordingly. 
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The Supreme Court has “established that the ‘irreducible 
constitutional minimum’ of standing consists of three elements.”  
Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).  “The plaintiff must have (1) suffered 
an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable judicial decision.”  Id.  “The plaintiff, as the 
party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of 
establishing these elements.”  Id.  “Since they are not mere 
pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the 
plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way 
as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of 
proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at 
the successive stages of the litigation.”  Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. at 561.  “In response to a summary judgment motion, however, 
the plaintiff can no longer rest on such ‘mere allegations,’ but 
must ‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts’” 
supporting its standing.  Id.  (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).  
Conversely, in order to grant summary judgment in a plaintiff’s 
favor, there must be no genuine issue of material fact as to that 
plaintiff’s standing. 
Because “the standing inquiry requires careful judicial 
examination of . . . whether the particular plaintiff is entitled 
to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted,” Allen v. 
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Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (emphasis added), standing must 
be assessed as to each plaintiff and each “plaintiff must 
demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought,” 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000).  Further, because Article III does not 
“permit[] suits against non-injurious defendants as long as one of 
the defendants in the suit injured the plaintiff,” standing must 
also be assessed as against each defendant.  Mahon v. Ticor Title 
Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 2012). 
We consider the three elements of standing as to the 
individual plaintiffs before turning to the Knight Institute’s 
standing. 
A. Injury-in-Fact 
“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he 
or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that 
is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  However, “[p]ast exposure to illegal 
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy 
regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any 
continuing, present adverse effects.”  City of Los Angeles v. 
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983) (alteration and omission in 
original) (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 
(1974)).  Though “[p]ast wrongs” serve as “evidence bearing on 
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whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury,” 
id. (internal quotation marks omitted), “[a] plaintiff seeking 
injunctive or declaratory relief cannot rely on past injury to 
satisfy the injury requirement,” Deshawn E. ex rel. Charlotte E. 
v. Safir, 156 F.3d 340, 344 (2d Cir. 1998).  Rather, that plaintiff 
“must show a likelihood that he or she will be injured in the 
future.”  Id.7 
“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, 
it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that 
the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III 
purposes.”  Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) 
(quoting Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2).  Therefore, 
“threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’ to constitute 
injury in fact” that satisfies Article III’s requirements.  
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (quoting Babbitt v. 
United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).  A 
“theory of standing [that] relies on a highly attenuated chain of 
possibilities[] does not satisfy the requirement that threatened 
injury must be certainly impending,” nor does an “objectively 
reasonable likelihood” that the injury will occur.  Clapper, 568 
                     
7 The absence of future injury also precludes a finding of redressability, 
thereby defeating standing to seek injunctive relief on a second basis.  See 
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 109 (1998) (“Because 
[plaintiff] alleges only past infractions of [law], and not a continuing 
violation or the likelihood of a future violation, injunctive relief will not 
redress its injury.”). 
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U.S. at 410 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 
496 (2009), and Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 157-60).   
Further, the injury must be concrete and particularized.  “For 
an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in 
a personal and individual way.’”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 
(quoting Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).  The plaintiff 
“must have a personal stake in the outcome” and must assert 
“something more than generalized grievances.”  United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179-80 (1974) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  An “impact on him [that] is plainly undifferentiated 
and common to all members of the public” is insufficient, id. at 
176 (internal quotation marks omitted), as is a mere “special 
interest” in a given problem without more, Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972).  At the same time, “standing is not to 
be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury.”  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 n.24 (2007) (quoting United 
States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).  “The fact that an injury may 
be suffered by a large number of people does not of itself make 
that injury a nonjusticiable generalized grievance.”  Spokeo, 136 
S. Ct. at 1548 n.7. 
Concreteness “is quite different from particularization.”  
Id. at 1548.  “A ‘concrete’ injury must be ‘de facto’; that is, it 
must actually exist.”  Id.  The term “‘[c]oncrete’ is not, however, 
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necessarily synonymous with ‘tangible,’” and “intangible injuries” 
-- including infringements on the exercise of First Amendment 
rights -- “can nevertheless be concrete.”  Id. at 1549 (citing 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993)). 
In this case, the record establishes a number of limitations 
on the individual plaintiffs’ use of Twitter as a result of having 
been blocked.  As long as they remain blocked, “the Individual 
Plaintiffs cannot view the President’s tweets; directly reply to 
these tweets; or use the @realDonaldTrump webpage to view the 
comment threads associated with the President’s tweets while they 
are logged in to their verified accounts.”  Stip. ¶ 54.  While 
alternative means of viewing the President’s tweets exist, Stip. 
¶¶ 55-56, and the individual plaintiffs “have the ability to view 
and reply to replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets, they cannot see 
the original @realDonaldTrump tweets themselves when signed in to 
their blocked accounts, and in many instances it is difficult to 
understand the reply tweets without the context of the original 
@realDonaldTrump tweets,” Stip. ¶ 58. 
These limitations are cognizable injuries-in-fact.  The 
individual plaintiffs’ ability to communicate using Twitter has 
been encumbered by these limitations (regardless of whether they 
are harms cognizable under the First Amendment).  Further, as long 
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as the individual plaintiffs remain blocked, their ability to 
communicate using Twitter will continue to be so limited.  Stip. 
¶¶ 28-31, 54.  The individual plaintiffs have experienced past 
harm in that their ability to use Twitter to interact with the 
President’s tweets has been limited, and -- absent some unforeseen 
change to the blocking functionality -- they will continue to 
experience that harm as long as they are blocked.  These future 
harms are not only certainly impending as required for standing 
purposes, but they are in fact virtually certain because the 
individual plaintiffs continue to be blocked.8 
These injuries are also concrete and particularized.  While 
they are not tangible in nature, these limitations are squarely 
within the “intangible injuries” previously determined to be 
concrete.  See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.  These limitations are 
also particularized, in that they have affected and will affect 
the individual plaintiffs in a “personal and individual way” -- 
each contends that his or her personal First Amendment rights have 
been and will continue to be encumbered, and the ability to 
communicate has been and will be limited because of each individual 
                     
8 Further, the Court suggested at oral argument that the parties consider 
a resolution of this dispute under which the individual plaintiffs would be 
unblocked and subsequently muted, an approach that would restore the individual 
plaintiffs’ ability to interact directly with (including by replying directly 
to) tweets from the @realDonaldTrump account while preserving the President’s 
ability to ignore tweets sent by users from whom he does not wish to hear.  The 
fact that no such resolution has been reached further suggests that the 
individual plaintiffs will continue to be blocked and, consequently, will 
continue to face the harms of which they complain. 
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plaintiff’s personal ownership of a Twitter account that was 
blocked.  See id. at 1548.  We accordingly conclude that the 
individual plaintiffs have established imminent injury-in-fact 
that is concrete and particularized, which is sufficient for 
Article III standing purposes. 
B. Causation 
The causation requirement demands that the complained-of 
injury “fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the 
defendant” as opposed to “injury that results from the independent 
action of some third party not before the court.”  Simon v. E. Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976).  While the Supreme 
Court has often defined the causation prong of standing with 
reference to a defendant’s challenged action, it has also referred 
to a defendant’s “conduct.”  See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian 
Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 
U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of 
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).  Accordingly, an omission may 
provide a basis for standing just as an affirmative action may.  
See Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Hellas Telecomms., S.à.r.l., 
790 F.3d 411, 417 (2d Cir. 2015) (describing causation as requiring 
“that the injury was in some sense caused by the opponent’s action 
or omission”); see also, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. 
Presidential Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, 878 F.3d 371, 
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378 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (referring to a “defendant’s action or 
omission”). 
“The traceability requirement for Article III standing means 
that the plaintiff must ‘demonstrate a causal nexus between the 
defendant’s conduct and the injury.’” Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 
F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 
148, 156 (2d Cir. 1992)).  “Proximate causation is not a 
requirement of Article III standing, which requires only that the 
plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
conduct.”  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 n.6 (2014). 
1. Sarah Huckabee Sanders 
Plaintiffs have not established standing against defendant 
Sanders.  “Ms. Sanders does not have access to the @realDonaldTrump 
account,” Stip. ¶ 11, and plaintiffs do not suggest that Sanders 
blocked the individual plaintiffs in the first instance or that 
she could unblock the individual plaintiffs upon a legal finding 
that such blocking is constitutionally impermissible.  
Accordingly, plaintiffs do not challenge any action that Sanders 
has taken (or can take).  The individual plaintiffs’ injuries-in-
fact are not attributable to Sanders, and they accordingly lack 
Article III standing to sue her.  See, e.g., Simon, 426 U.S. at 
41-42.  Summary judgment will therefore be granted in favor of 
defendant Sanders. 
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2. Daniel Scavino 
In contrast to Sanders, “Mr. Scavino has access to the 
@realDonaldTrump account, including the access necessary to block 
and unblock individuals from the @realDonaldTrump account.”  Stip. 
¶ 12.  Indeed, “Mr. Scavino posts messages on behalf of President 
Trump to @realDonaldTrump and other social media accounts,” Stip. 
¶ 12, and “assists President Trump in operating the 
@realDonaldTrump account, including by drafting and posting tweets 
to the account,” Stip. ¶ 39.  While Scavino unquestionably has 
access to the @realDonaldTrump account and participates in its 
operation, such involvement does not, by itself, establish that 
the plaintiffs’ injuries may be fairly traced to an action taken 
by Scavino as required for standing purposes.  The only evidence 
in the record as to Scavino pertains to this general involvement, 
and the record is devoid of any suggestion that he blocked the 
individual plaintiffs. 
Nonetheless, the Second Circuit and several other Courts of 
Appeals have recognized that in cases seeking prospective relief, 
an official defendant’s lack of personal involvement in past 
constitutional violations does not render that defendant an 
improper one for purposes of prospective declaratory or injunctive 
relief from continuing violations -- provided that the defendant 
maintains some connection to, or responsibility for, the 
continuing violation.  See Koehl v. Dalsheim, 85 F.3d 86, 89 (2d 
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Cir. 1996) (holding that “the complaint also sought injunctive 
relief against [a defendant official], and dismissal of that claim 
was not warranted” despite the “lack of an allegation of personal 
involvement” warranting dismissal of a damages claim); Pugh v. 
Goord, 571 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Sullivan, J.) 
(requiring “only that a defendant have a ‘connection’ with the 
[allegedly unconstitutional] act, and not more” (citing, inter 
alia, Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Nickel (In re Dairy 
Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 411 F.3d 367, 372-73 (2d Cir. 
2005))); Loren v. Levy, No. 00 Civ. 7687, 2003 WL 1702004, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003) (Chin, J.) (“[A]ctions involving claims 
for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief are permissible 
provided the official against whom the action is brought has a 
direct connection to, or responsibility for, the alleged illegal 
action.” (quoting Davidson v. Scully, 148 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)), aff’d, 120 F. App’x 393 (2d Cir. 2005); see also 
Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 332 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Our 
conclusion that the State Defendants lacked personal involvement 
in past constitutional violations does not preclude [plaintiff] 
from obtaining prospective injunctive relief for ongoing 
violations.”); Pouncil v. Tilton, 704 F.3d 568, 576 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that a named defendant official was a “proper defendant 
on a claim for prospective injunctive relief . . . because he would 
be responsible for ensuring that injunctive relief was carried 
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out, even if he was not personally involved in the decision giving 
rise to [plaintiff’s] claims”); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 
311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“[S]ince [plaintiff] also 
seeks injunctive relief it is irrelevant whether [the defendant 
official] participated in the alleged violations.”). 
While this line of cases developed in the context of suits 
against state officials and the Ex parte Young exception to state 
sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, see In re Dairy 
Mart, 411 F.3d at 372-73; see also Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 
1139, 1151 (10th Cir. 2007); Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch. 
No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1341-42 (Fed. Cir. 2006), it is no less 
applicable to the present context of suits against federal 
officials.9  As the Supreme Court has explained, suits seeking 
prospective relief against federal officials alleging continuing 
constitutional violations and those against state officials share 
common characteristics and a common historical basis: “we have 
long held that federal courts may in some circumstances grant 
injunctive relief against state officers who are violating, or 
planning to violate, federal law.  But that has been true not only 
with respect to violations of federal law by state officials, but 
also with respect to violations of federal law by federal 
officials.”  Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
                     
9 Both parties’ reliance on other precedents developed in the context of 
suits against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 further persuades us that 
this line of precedent is applicable here. 
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1378, 1384 (2015) (citations omitted).  “The ability to sue to 
enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is 
the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of 
judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to 
England.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
The lack of a prior personal involvement requirement in 
actions seeking prospective relief does not vitiate standing’s 
traceability requirement, as defendants suggest.  The defendant 
official’s connection to the ongoing violation, see, e.g., 
Parkell, 833 F.3d at 332; Pouncil, 704 F.3d at 576; Gonzalez, 663 
F.3d at 315; Pugh, 571 F. Supp. 2d at 517, satisfies the 
traceability requirement.  Assuming the existence of an ongoing 
violation, an official who has some connection to the violation -
- i.e., one who may prospectively remedy it -- will contribute to 
the violation and the future injury-in-fact that it may inflict by 
failing to do so.  Here, assuming that the blocking of the 
individual plaintiffs infringes their First Amendment rights, 
those rights will continue to be infringed as long as they remain 
blocked.  Cf. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102 (“[P]ast exposure to illegal 
conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy 
regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any 
continuing, present adverse effects.” (omission in original) 
(quoting O’Shea, 414 U.S. at 495-96)).  Because Scavino has the 
ability to unblock the plaintiffs, any future injury will be 
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traceable to him because it will have resulted, at least in part, 
from his failure to unblock them.  Ultimately, as defendants’ 
quoted authority explains, “[s]tanding should be recognized as 
long as the duty claim survives, but becomes irrelevant when 
litigation reaches the point of rejecting the duty.”  13A Charles 
A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3531.5 (3d ed.) 
(Westlaw 2018).  Because we must consider standing before the 
merits, we have not at this point in the analysis considered 
plaintiffs’ claim that the First Amendment imposes a duty on 
Scavino to unblock the individual plaintiffs.10  We therefore 
conclude that the traceability requirement of standing is 
satisfied as to Scavino. 
3. The President 
The record definitively establishes that the plaintiffs’ 
injuries-in-fact are directly traceable to the President’s 
actions.  “The President blocked [each of the individual 
plaintiffs] from the @realDonaldTrump account.”  Stip. ¶¶ 46-52; 
see also Stip. ¶ 54 (referring to “the President’s blocking of the 
                     
10 Indeed, this passage of Federal Practice and Procedure suggests that a 
plaintiff asserting a duty claim has standing as long as the claim remains 
viable, and that the issue of standing becomes irrelevant when the duty is 
rejected -- as the claim will have failed on the merits at that point.  The 
government’s argument that plaintiffs lack standing as to Scavino because 
Scavino has no duty therefore inverts the analysis by resolving the merits 
before standing.  Cf. Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (“[J]urisdiction . . . is not 
defeated . . . by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause 
of action on which petitioners could actually recover.” (omissions in original) 
(quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)). 
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Individual Plaintiffs”).  The causation requirement is therefore 
amply satisfied as to the President. 
C. Redressability 
In order for redressability to be satisfied, “it must be 
likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or redress 
the injury.”  Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. at 493.  That is, 
redressability must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative,” 
Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181, but it “is not a demand for mathematical 
certainty,” Mhany Mgmt., Inc. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 
602 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Toll Bros., Inc. v. Township of 
Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 143 (3d Cir. 2009)).  “All that is 
required is a showing that such relief be reasonably designed to 
improve the opportunities of a plaintiff not otherwise disabled to 
avoid the specific injury alleged.”  Huntington Branch, NAACP v. 
Town of Huntington, 689 F.2d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 1982). 
Further, any relief provided need not be complete.  “The 
redressability element of the Article III standing requirement and 
the ‘complete relief’ referred to by Rule 19 [of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure] are not identical,” Defs. of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. at 570 n.4 (emphasis omitted) (plurality opinion),11 and a 
                     
11 Rule 19(a) mandates the joinder of additional persons as parties if “in 
that person’s absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing 
parties,” provided that the joinder of that party does “not deprive the court 
of subject-matter jurisdiction.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A).  Justice 
Blackmun, dissenting in Defenders of Wildlife, had contended that the 
plurality’s analysis of redressability rendered superfluous Rule 19’s 
contemplation that the joinder of additional parties would be needed to afford 
Case 1:17-cv-05205-NRB   Document 72   Filed 05/23/18   Page 30 of 75
SPA.30
Case 18-1691, Document 25, 08/07/2018, 2362018, Page79 of 124
31 
plaintiff “need not show that a favorable decision will relieve 
his every injury,” Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 n.15 
(1982).  As the Tenth Circuit has subsequently explained, “if the 
law required that the requested relief afford complete redress, 
the Supreme Court would not have allowed Massachusetts to proceed 
against the EPA, as there was no guarantee a favorable decision 
would mitigate future environmental damage, much less redress it 
completely.”  Consumer Data Indus. Ass’n v. King, 678 F.3d 898, 
905 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 
526); see also WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 795 
F.3d 1148, 1156 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Partial relief . . . would 
qualify as redress for standing purposes.” (citing Meese v. Keene, 
481 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1987))).  “[E]ven if [plaintiffs] would not 
be out of the woods, a favorable decision would relieve their 
problem ‘to some extent,’ which is all the law requires.”  Consumer 
Data, 678 F.3d at 903. 
We therefore conclude that the plaintiffs’ injuries may be 
redressed through declaratory relief or through injunctive relief 
directed at Scavino: the plaintiffs’ future injuries will be 
prevented if they are unblocked -- an action within Scavino’s 
power.  Stip. ¶ 12.  Nor is this redressability undercut, as 
defendants suggest, by the President’s ability to block 
                     
complete relief, as redressability would be lacking as an initial matter.  See 
504 U.S. at 598 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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individuals.  The D.C. Circuit has explained that “the partial 
relief [the plaintiff] can obtain against subordinate executive 
officials is sufficient for redressability, even recognizing that 
the President has the power, if he so chose, to undercut this 
relief,” Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 980-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996), 
reasoning that has since been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit, see 
Made in the USA Found. v. United States, 242 F.3d 1300, 1309-11 
(11th Cir. 2001).  Any declaratory or injunctive relief as to 
Scavino that results in the unblocking of the individual plaintiffs 
will redress at least some of their future injury, regardless of 
whether the President could, theoretically, reblock them 
subsequently.  And of course, “we may assume it is substantially 
likely that the President and other executive . . . officials would 
abide by an authoritative interpretation of [a] . . . 
constitutional provision by the District Court, even though they 
would not be directly bound by such a determination.”  Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 803 (1992) (plurality opinion); see 
also Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 463-64 (2002).12  This substantial 
likelihood, though not a mathematical certainty, is more than 
                     
12 This case involves the interpretation of only one law -- the First 
Amendment.  The Government’s reliance on Delta Construction Co. v. EPA, 783 
F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam), and Doe v. Cuomo, 755 F.3d 105 (2d 
Cir. 2014), each of which involved a plaintiff or petitioner subject to the 
requirements of multiple laws, is accordingly misplaced.  In each of those 
cases, the action that the plaintiff or petitioner sought to undertake would be 
restricted by the unchallenged law, even if the plaintiff or petitioner were 
ultimately successful in challenging the first law. 
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sufficient to establish the redressability of plaintiffs’ 
injuries.13 
D. The Knight Institute’s Organizational Standing 
“Under [the] theory of ‘organizational’ standing, the 
organization is just another person -- albeit a legal person -- 
seeking to vindicate a right.”  N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. 
N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 294 (2d Cir. 2012).14  When 
organizations “sue on their own behalf, they must independently 
satisfy the requirements of Article III standing.”  Knife Rights, 
Inc. v. Vance, 802 F.3d 377, 388 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79 (1982)).  Therefore, 
the Knight Institute, “as an organization, [bears] the burden of 
showing: (i) an imminent ‘injury in fact’ to itself as an 
organization (rather than to its members) that is ‘distinct and 
                     
13 Our conclusion that the individual plaintiffs’ injuries are redressable 
through relief directed at Scavino does not depend on his presence as a 
defendant.  “The power conferred by the [All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,] 
extends, under appropriate circumstances, to persons who, though not parties to 
the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate 
the implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice, 
and encompasses even those who have not taken any affirmative action to hinder 
justice.”  United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977) (citations 
omitted); see also Made in the USA, 242 F.3d at 1310 n.25; Swan, 100 F.3d at 
980; cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2) (providing that injunctions and restraining 
orders bind not only the parties but also their “officers, agents, servants, 
employees, and attorneys” and “other persons who are in active concert or 
participation” with those persons).  Accordingly, even if Scavino were not a 
defendant, relief could nonetheless be properly directed at him. 
14 An organizational plaintiff may also have associational standing, under 
which “[a]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members 
when its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, the 
interests at stake are germane to the organization’s purpose, and neither the 
claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual 
members in the lawsuit.”  Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 181.  The Knight Institute does 
not assert that it has standing under an associational standing theory. 
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palpable’; (ii) that its injury is ‘fairly traceable’ to [the 
complained-of act]; and (iii) that a favorable decision would 
redress its injuries.”  Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust 
Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2017) 
(quoting Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 156 (2d Cir. 2011)).   
Here, the Knight Institute has sufficiently established an 
injury-in-fact: the infringement of its desire “to read comments 
that otherwise would have been posted by the blocked Plaintiffs 
. . . in direct reply to @realDonaldTrump tweets.”  Stip. ¶ 61.  
This infringement is a cognizable interest for standing purposes, 
cf. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-63 (“[T]he desire to use or 
observe . . . is undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of 
standing”), and the Knight Institute’s following of one of the 
individual plaintiffs establishes that the Knight Institute “would 
thereby be ‘directly’ affected apart from” its special interest in 
the First Amendment, id. at 563.  Contrary to defendants’ assertion 
that the Knight Institute’s standing rests on an impermissibly 
attenuated chain of possibilities, the injury in question is 
straightforward: first, the individual plaintiffs cannot reply 
directly to the President’s tweets because they have been blocked, 
Stip. ¶¶ 28, 54, and second, the Knight Foundation possesses a 
desire to read the direct replies that would have been tweeted, 
Stip. ¶ 61. 
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Defendants further contend that the Knight Institute has 
suffered a noncognizable generalized grievance, but nothing in the 
record suggests that the citizenry writ large desires to read the 
individual plaintiffs’ tweets engaging with the President’s tweets 
as the Knight Institute does.15  Even assuming a large number of 
other individuals share such a desire, that numerosity would not 
render the Knight Institute’s injury a generalized grievance that 
cannot support Article III standing.  See, e.g., Spokeo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1548 n.7; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 526 n.24. 
And even assuming arguendo that the Knight Institute’s 
assertion of its desire to view the individual plaintiffs’ tweets 
standing alone is insufficient to support standing, see, e.g., 
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 562-64; Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife 
Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 886-89 (1990), any insufficiency is remedied 
by the fact that the Knight Institute did and does follow one of 
the individual plaintiffs, Stip. ¶ 62.  Defendants correctly note 
that the Knight Institute did not follow on Twitter six of the 
seven individual plaintiffs’ accounts (as of one month after this 
lawsuit was filed), Stip. ¶ 62, but the Knight Institute’s 
following of one of the individual plaintiffs is significant and 
represents “dispositively more than the mere ‘general averments’ 
and ‘conclusory allegations’ found inadequate in National Wildlife 
Federation,” Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 184 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 
                     
15  We would in fact be highly skeptical of any such contention. 
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497 U.S. at 888), and comparable cases.  We therefore conclude 
that the Knight Institute has established an injury-in-fact 
necessary to support its organizational standing. 
The causation and redressability elements of standing are 
also satisfied as to the Knight Institute.  The causation analysis 
as to the Knight Institute largely follows that applicable to the 
individual plaintiffs: the Knight Institute’s injury -- the 
inability to read the individual plaintiffs’ direct replies to the 
President’s tweets -- is a direct consequence of the individual 
plaintiffs being unable to reply directly to the President’s 
tweets, which is, in turn, a direct consequence of the individual 
plaintiffs having been blocked.  Stip. ¶¶ 28, 54, 59, 61.  The 
Knight Institute’s injuries are similarly redressable -- if the 
individual plaintiffs were unblocked, they would be able to tweet 
direct replies to tweets sent by @realDonaldTrump and the Knight 
Institute would again be able to fulfill its desire to read those 
direct replies.  While the individual plaintiffs would need to 
choose to reply in order for the Knight Institute to read a reply, 
certain individual plaintiffs’ attempts to circumvent blocking’s 
limitation on direct replies, Stip. ¶ 59, and the individual 
plaintiffs’ identification of the burdens posed by blocking as 
prompting their reduced engagement, Stip. ¶ 60, strongly suggests 
that at least some of the individual plaintiffs are likely to reply 
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if they were to have the capacity to do so.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Knight Institute also has standing. 
III. First Amendment 
Concluding that the individual plaintiffs and the Knight 
Institute both have standing to sue Scavino and the President, we 
turn to the First Amendment’s application to the distinctly twenty-
first century medium of Twitter.  The primary point of dispute 
between the parties is whether a public official’s blocking of the 
individual plaintiffs on Twitter implicates a forum for First 
Amendment purposes.  Our analysis of this question proceeds in 
several steps. 
“[W]e must first decide whether” the speech in which the 
individual plaintiffs seek to engage “is speech protected by the 
First Amendment.”  Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985); see also Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 677 (1992).  A 
conclusion that individual plaintiffs’ speech is protected speech, 
however, “merely begins our inquiry.”  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799.  
We must then assess whether the putative forum is susceptible to 
forum analysis at all, see Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 
523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (“Other government properties are . . . 
not fora at all.”); see also Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 480 
(identifying when “forum analysis is out of place”), identifying 
with particularity the putative forum at issue, see Cornelius, 473 
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U.S. at 800.  If so, we must then determine its classification.  
Id. (“Having defined the relevant forum, we must then determine 
whether it is public or nonpublic in nature.”).16  To the extent 
we conclude that a First Amendment forum is implicated, we consider 
whether “the extent to which the Government [has] control[led] 
access” is consistent with the class of forum identified.  Id. 
A. Protected Speech 
Our inquiry into whether the speech at issue is protected by 
the First Amendment is straightforward.  The individual plaintiffs 
seek to engage in political speech, Stip. ¶¶ 46-52, and such 
“speech on matters of public concern” “fall within the core of 
First Amendment protection,” Engquist v. Ore. Dep’t of Agric., 553 
U.S. 591, 600 (2008).  Indeed, there is no suggestion that the 
speech in which the individual plaintiffs engaged and seek to 
engage fall within the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes 
of speech,” such as obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and 
speech integral to criminal conduct, “the prevention and 
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem.”  Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 
786, 791 (2011) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 571-72 (1942)); see also United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
                     
16 That is, the question of whether a space is susceptible to forum 
analysis is analytically distinct from the question, assuming that forum 
analysis applies, of what type of forum (traditional public, designated public, 
or non-public) the space is. 
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460, 468 (2010).  We readily conclude the speech in which 
individual plaintiffs seek to engage is protected speech. 
B. Applicability of Forum Doctrine 
We turn next to the applicability of forum doctrine.  As a 
threshold matter, for a space to be susceptible to forum analysis, 
it must be owned or controlled by the government.  See, e.g., 
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[A] speaker must seek access to public 
property or to private property dedicated to public use to evoke 
First Amendment concerns.”).  Further, the application of forum 
doctrine must be consistent with the purpose, structure, and 
intended use of the space.  See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, 555 
U.S. at 480 (“[W]here the application of forum analysis would lead 
almost inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum 
analysis is out of place.”). 
The Supreme Court has instructed that in determining whether 
these requirements are satisfied (i.e., whether forum analysis can 
be appropriately applied), we should identify the putative forum 
by “focus[ing] on the access sought by the speaker.”  Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 801; see Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), 
69 F.3d 650, 655 (2d Cir. 1995).  “When speakers seek general 
access to public property, the forum encompasses that property.”  
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801.  By contrast, “[i]n cases in which 
limited access is sought, [the Supreme Court’s] cases have taken 
a more tailored approach to ascertaining the perimeters of a 
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forum.”  Id.  For example, in Cornelius, where plaintiffs sought 
access to a fundraising drive conducted in the federal workplace, 
the fundraising drive specifically, rather than the federal 
workplace generally, constituted the would-be forum.  Id.  
Similarly, in Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ 
Ass’n, where the plaintiff sought access to a public school’s 
internal mail system in order to distribute literature, the mail 
system rather than the school was the space in question.  460 U.S. 
37, 46-47 (1983).  And in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, where 
the plaintiff sought access to advertising space on the side of 
city buses, the advertising space and not the buses constituted 
the putative forum.  418 U.S. 298, 300-01 (1974).  Indeed, this 
exercise in carefully delineating the putative forum based on the 
access sought is not an academic one.  For instance, a public park 
is susceptible to forum analysis when “used for purposes of 
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions,” Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague 
v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of 
Roberts, J.)), but the same public park is not when “the 
installation of permanent monuments” is concerned, Pleasant Grove 
City, 555 U.S. at 480. 
We can therefore reject, at the outset, any contention that 
the @realDonaldTrump account as a whole is the would-be forum to 
be analyzed.  Plaintiffs do not seek access to the account as a 
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whole -- they do not desire the ability to send tweets as the 
President, the ability to receive notifications that the President 
would receive, or the ability to decide who the President follows 
on Twitter.  Because the access they seek is far narrower, we 
consider whether forum doctrine can be appropriately applied to 
several aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account rather than the 
account as a whole: the content of the tweets sent, the timeline 
comprised of those tweets, the comment threads initiated by each 
of those tweets, and the “interactive space” associated with each 
tweet in which other users may directly interact with the content 
of the tweets by, for example, replying to, retweeting, or liking 
the tweet. 
1. Government Ownership or Control 
First, to potentially qualify as a forum, the space in 
question must be owned or controlled by the government.  While the 
Supreme Court has frequently referred to “government-owned 
property,” e.g., Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 478; see also 
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678 (referring to property that the government 
“owns and controls”), its precedents have also made clear that a 
space may be a forum based on government control even absent legal 
ownership, see, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 (2010) (“[T]his Court has 
employed forum analysis to determine when a governmental entity, 
in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on 
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speech.” (emphasis added)); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 801 (“[A] 
speaker must seek access to public property or to private property 
dedicated to public use to evoke First Amendment concerns.” 
(emphasis added)); Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46 (“[T]he ‘First 
Amendment does not guarantee access to property simply because it 
is owned or controlled by the government.’” (emphasis added) 
(quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 
453 U.S. 114, 130 (1981))); see also Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. 
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (concluding that a “privately 
owned . . . theater under long-term lease to the city,” id. at 
547, was a public forum, id. at 555).  This requirement of 
governmental control, rather than complete governmental ownership, 
is not only consistent with forum analysis’s focus on “the extent 
to which the Government can control access” to the space and 
whether that control comports with the First Amendment, Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 800, but also better reflects that a space can be “a 
forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic 
sense,” Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 
U.S. 819, 830 (1995), and may “lack[] a physical situs,” Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 801, in which case traditional conceptions of 
“ownership” may fit less well. 
Here, the government-control prong of the analysis is met.  
Though Twitter is a private (though publicly traded) company that 
is not government-owned, the President and Scavino nonetheless 
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exercise control over various aspects of the @realDonaldTrump 
account: they control the content of the tweets that are sent from 
the account and they hold the ability to prevent, through blocking, 
other Twitter users, including the individual plaintiffs here, 
from accessing the @realDonaldTrump timeline (while logged into 
the blocked account) and from participating in the interactive 
space associated with the tweets sent by the @realDonaldTrump 
account, Stip. ¶¶ 12, 28-32, 39, 54.  Though Twitter also maintains 
control over the @realDonaldTrump account (and all other Twitter 
accounts), we nonetheless conclude that the extent to which the 
President and Scavino can, and do, exercise control over aspects 
of the @realDonaldTrump account are sufficient to establish the 
government-control element as to the content of the tweets sent by 
the @realDonaldTrump account, the timeline compiling those tweets, 
and the interactive space associated with each of those tweets.  
While their control does not extend to the content of a retweet or 
reply when made -- “[n]o other Twitter user can alter the content 
of any retweet or reply, either before or after it is posted” and 
a user “cannot prescreen tweets, replies, likes, or mentions that 
reference their tweets or accounts,” Stip. ¶ 26 -- it nonetheless 
extends to controlling who has the power to retweet or reply in 
the first instance. 
The President and Scavino’s control over the @realDonaldTrump 
account is also governmental.  The record establishes (1) that the 
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@realDonaldTrump account is presented as being “registered to 
Donald J. Trump, ‘45th President of the United States of America, 
Washington, D.C.,’” Stip. ¶ 35; (2) “that the President’s tweets 
from @realDonaldTrump . . . are official records that must be 
preserved under the Presidential Records Act,” Stip. ¶ 40; see 44 
U.S.C. § 2202 (directing the retention of “Presidential records”; 
id. § 2201(2) (defining “Presidential records” as those created 
“in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an 
effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or 
other official or ceremonial duties of the President”); and (3) 
that the @realDonaldTrump account has been used in the course of 
the appointment of officers (including cabinet secretaries), the 
removal of officers, and the conduct of foreign policy, Stip. ¶ 38 
-- all of which are squarely executive functions, see U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (appointments); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492-93 (2010) (relating 
the President’s removal power to “his responsibility to take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed” under Article II, section 3, 
clause 5 of the Constitution (emphasis omitted)); Zivotofsky ex 
rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) (“The 
President does have a unique role in communicating with foreign 
governments . . . .”).  That is, the President presents the 
@realDonaldTrump account as being a presidential account as 
opposed to a personal account and, more importantly, uses the 
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account to take actions that can be taken only by the President as 
President.  Accordingly, we conclude that the control that the 
President and Scavino exercise over the account and certain of its 
features is governmental in nature. 
Defendants contend that the governmental control-or-ownership 
prong is not met because we must also analyze the specific action 
in question -- blocking -- under the “under color of state law” 
precedents developed in the context of actions against state 
officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  In that context, the standards 
for whether an action was taken “under color of state law” and for 
whether an action constitutes “state action” are identical, see 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982), and an 
official takes action under color of state law when he “exercise[s] 
power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’”  
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. 
Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).  Invoking this standard, 
defendants contend that the act of blocking is not state action 
triggering First Amendment scrutiny because blocking is a 
functionality made available to every Twitter user, Stip. ¶ 28, 
and is therefore not a power possessed by virtue of state law. 
While the Constitution applies only to the government and not 
private individuals, the requirement of state action in the forum 
context is not usually analyzed separately (either in general or 
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under the West standard specifically) from the government control-
or-ownership requirement.  As the Second Circuit has recently 
explained, “[b]ecause facilities or locations deemed to be public 
forums are usually operated by governments, determining that a 
particular facility or location is a public forum usually suffices 
to render the challenged action taken there to be state action 
subject to First Amendment limitations.”  Halleck v. Manhattan 
Cmty. Access Corp., 882 F.3d 300, 306–07 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265-68 (1981), and City of 
Madison, Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 
429 U.S. 167, 169-76 (1976)).  While further analysis may be 
necessary when the party exercising control over the forum is a 
nongovernmental entity, see, e.g., id. at 307, in which case 
consideration of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in 
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 
531 U.S. 288, 295-96 (2001), may be appropriate, the Brentwood 
factors are a poor fit for the facts of this case: the parties 
exercising control here are a public official, the President, and 
his subordinate, Scavino, acting in his official capacity.17 
                     
17 In Brentwood, the Supreme Court considered whether “a not-for-profit 
membership corporation organized to regulate interscholastic sport among the 
public and private high schools” engaged in state action when it enforced its 
regulations against a member school.  531 U.S. at 291.  The Court held that 
“state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a ‘close nexus 
between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior 
‘may be fairly treated as that of the State itself,’” but acknowledged that 
“[w]hat is fairly attributable is a matter of normative judgment, and the 
criteria lack rigid simplicity.”  Id. at 295 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison 
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Further, this argument, which focuses on the act of exclusion 
divorced from the context of the space from which a person is being 
excluded, proves too much and is difficult to reconcile with the 
Supreme Court’s public forum precedents.  Defendants correctly 
argue that blocking is a capability held by every Twitter user, 
Stip. ¶ 28, but the power to exclude is also one afforded generally 
to every property owner.  When a government acts to “legally 
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is 
dedicated,” it behaves “like the private owner of property.”  
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 390 (1993); see also, e.g., Greer 
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (“The State, no less than a private 
owner of property, has the power to preserve the property under 
its control . . . .”).  Indeed, when the government exercises its 
“right to exclude others from entering and using [its] property,” 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005), it is 
deploying “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property,” Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994).  The right to exclude is “perhaps 
the most fundamental of all property interests,” Lingle, 544 U.S. 
                     
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1976)).  After analyzing a number of factors, including 
(1) whether the private actor was acting pursuant to the state’s coercive power, 
(2) whether the private actor was undertaking a public function, and (3) whether 
the private actor received significant encouragement from the state or whether 
its functions were entwined with governmental policies, the Court concluded 
that state action was present.  See id. at 295-96; see also Sybalski v. Indep. 
Grp. Home Living Program, Inc., 546 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) 
(analyzing Brentwood). 
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at 539, and it is one shared by the government and private property 
owners alike.  The context of the property from which the 
government is excluding, therefore, must factor into the analysis.  
No one can seriously contend that a public official’s blocking of 
a constituent from her purely personal Twitter account -- one that 
she does not impress with the trappings of her office and does not 
use to exercise the authority of her position -- would implicate 
forum analysis, but those are hardly the facts of this case. 
For the same reason, defendants’ reliance on the President’s 
establishment of the account in 2009, Stip. ¶ 32 -- well before 
his election and inauguration as President -- is unpersuasive.  To 
the extent forum analysis applies, “[t]he past history of 
characterization of a forum may well be relevant; but that does 
not mean a present characterization about a forum may be 
disregarded.”  Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 77 
(1st Cir. 2004); see Make the Rd. by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 
F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing that certain First 
Amendment restrictions apply “so long as a forum remains public”); 
cf. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 650 F.3d 30, 41 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (reasoning that “the nature of the site changes” 
depending on how the site is being used).  The Supreme Court has 
expressly held that “a state is not required to indefinitely retain 
the open character of the facility,” e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 
U.S. at 46, but changes need not be one-directional.  Indeed, the 
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entire concept of a designated public forum rests on the premise 
that the nature of a (previously closed) space has been changed.  
See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.   
To take two examples, if a facility initially developed by 
the government as a military base -- plainly not a public forum 
under Greer, 424 U.S. at 838 -- is subsequently decommissioned and 
repurposed into a public park,18 the present use of the facility 
as a park would bear much more heavily on the forum analysis than 
its historical origins as a military installation.  Similarly, if 
a privately constructed airport were subsequently taken over by a 
public agency, forum analysis would focus on its current use as a 
public airport rather than its prior use as a private one.  Cf. 
ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 681 (“The practices of privately held 
transportation centers do not bear on the government’s regulatory 
authority over a publicly owned airport.”). 
Here, the President and Scavino’s present use of the 
@realDonaldTrump account weighs far more heavily in the analysis 
than the origin of the account as the creation of private citizen 
Donald Trump.  That latter fact cannot be given the dispositive 
weight that defendants would ascribe to it.  Rather, because the 
President and Scavino use the @realDonaldTrump account for 
                     
18 Cf. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t v. United States, No. 17-cv-
2223, 2018 WL 1152264, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 5, 2008) (describing the creation 
of a national wildlife refuge from portions of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal). 
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governmental functions, the control they exercise over it is 
accordingly governmental in nature. 
That control, however, does not extend to the comment thread 
initiated by a tweet sent by the @realDonaldTrump account.  The 
comment thread -- consisting of the initial tweet, direct replies 
to that tweet, and second-order (and higher-order) replies to those 
replies -- therefore cannot be a putative forum.  While the 
President and Scavino can control the interactive space by limiting 
who may directly reply or retweet a tweet initially sent by the 
@realDonaldTrump account, they lack comparable control over the 
subsequent dialogue in the comment thread.  As plaintiffs 
acknowledge, even the individual plaintiffs who have been blocked 
“can view replies to @realDonaldTrump tweets, and can post replies 
to those replies, while logged in to the blocked accounts,” and 
that these “[r]eplies-to-replies appear in the comment threads 
that originate with @realDonaldTrump tweets.”  Stip. ¶ 57.  Because 
a Twitter user lacks control over the comment thread beyond the 
control exercised over first-order replies through blocking, the 
comment threads -- as distinguished from the content of tweets 
sent by @realDonaldTrump, the @realDonaldTrump timeline, and the 
interactive space associated with each tweet -- do not meet the 
threshold criterion for being a forum. 
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2. Purpose, Structure, and Intended Use 
We next assess whether application of forum analysis is 
consistent with the purpose, structure, and intended use of the 
three aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account that we have found 
to satisfy the government control-or-ownership criterion: 
specifically, the content of tweets, the timeline comprised of the 
account’s tweets, and the interactive space of each tweet. 
Generally, “[t]he forum doctrine has been applied in 
situations in which government-owned property or a government 
program was capable of accommodating a large number of public 
speakers without defeating the essential function of the land or 
the program.”  Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 478.  By contrast, 
forum analysis is not appropriately applied when “the government 
has broad discretion to make content-based judgments in deciding 
what private speech to make available to the public.”  United 
States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 204 (2003) (plurality 
opinion).  For example, the Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen a 
public broadcaster exercises editorial discretion in the selection 
and presentation of its programming,” its decisions are not subject 
to forum analysis.  Forbes, 523 U.S. at 674.  Forum analysis was 
inappropriate, the Court reasoned, because “[c]laims of access 
under [the Court’s] public forum precedents could obstruct the 
legitimate purposes of television broadcasters.”  Id.  “[B]road 
rights of access for outside speakers would be antithetical, as a 
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general rule, to the discretion that stations and their editorial 
staff must exercise to fulfill their journalistic purpose and 
statutory obligations.”  Id. at 673.  Similarly, the Supreme Court 
has declined to apply forum analysis to a grant program operated 
by the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), reasoning that “[t]he 
NEA’s mandate is to make esthetic judgments” and the application 
of an “inherently content-based ‘excellence’ threshold for NEA 
support.”  Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 
586 (1998).  And applying Forbes and Finley, a four-Justice 
plurality of the Supreme Court concluded that the internet access 
provided by public libraries was not susceptible to forum analysis, 
as forum analysis was “incompatible with the discretion that public 
libraries must have to fulfill their traditional missions,” which 
involve the “exercise of judgment in selecting the material [the 
library] provides to its patrons.”  Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 
205 (plurality opinion).19  Ultimately, “where the application of 
forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to closing of the 
forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of place.”  
Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 480. 
Government speech is one category of speech that falls outside 
the domain of forum analysis: when the government “is speaking on 
its own behalf, the First Amendment strictures that attend the 
                     
19 Additionally, Justice Breyer agreed that forum analysis was not 
applicable to the provision of internet access in public libraries.  See Am. 
Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 215-16 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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various types of government-established forums do not apply.”  
Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2239, 2250 (2015).  “The Free Speech Clause restricts [only] 
government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate 
government speech.”  Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 467. 
However, “[t]here may be situations in which it is difficult 
to tell whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf 
or is providing a forum for private speech.”  Id. at 470.  Private 
involvement in the formulation of the speech in question does not 
preclude the conclusion that it is government speech.  For example, 
Pleasant Grove City concluded that monuments that were privately 
financed but subsequently accepted by a municipal government and 
displayed on public park land was government speech, see id. at 
470-71, and Walker held that specialty license plate designs 
proposed by private groups but approved and issued by a state 
department of motor vehicles was also government speech, see 135 
S. Ct. at 2248-50.  Conversely, “speech that is otherwise private 
does not become speech of the government merely because the 
government provides a forum for the speech or in some way allows 
or facilitates it.”  Wandering Dago, Inc. v. Destito, 879 F.3d 20, 
34 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 811-13). 
In assessing whether speech constitutes government speech as 
opposed to private speech, the Supreme Court has considered at 
least three factors: whether government has historically used the 
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speech in question “to convey state messages,” whether that speech 
is “often closely identified in the public mind” with the 
government, and the extent to which government “maintain[s] direct 
control over the messages conveyed,” with Walker’s application of 
these factors “likely mark[ing] the outer bounds of the government-
speech doctrine.”  Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1760 (2017) 
(quoting Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246-49); see also Wandering Dago, 
879 F.3d at 34 (distilling the same three factors from Walker). 
Based on the government speech doctrine, we reject out of 
hand any contention that the content of the President’s tweets are 
susceptible to forum analysis.  It is not so susceptible because 
the content is government speech: the record establishes that the 
President, sometimes “[w]ith the assistance of Mr. Scavino,” uses 
the content of his tweets “to announce, describe, and defend his 
policies; to promote his Administration’s legislative agenda; to 
announce official decisions; to engage with foreign political 
leaders; to publicize state visits; to challenge media 
organizations whose coverage of his Administration he believes to 
be unfair; and for other statements, including on occasion 
statements unrelated to official government business.”  Stip.  
¶ 38.  Indeed, the content of the tweets sent by @realDonaldTrump 
are solely the speech of the President or of other government 
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officials.  Stip. ¶ 39.20  For the same reason, the account’s 
timeline, which “displays all tweets generated by the [account]” 
is not susceptible to forum analysis: the timeline merely 
aggregates the content of all of the account’s tweets, Stip. ¶ 15, 
all of which is government speech. 
The same cannot be said, however, of the interactive space 
for replies and retweets created by each tweet sent by the 
@realDonaldTrump account.  At minimum, as to replies, they are 
most directly associated with the replying user rather than the 
sender of the tweet being replied to: a reply tweet appears with 
the picture, name, and handle of the replying user, Stip. ¶¶ 23, 
57, and appears most prominently in the timeline of the replying 
user, Stip. ¶ 22.  Replying tweets are “controlled by the user who 
generates them,” and “[n]o other Twitter user can alter the content 
of any . . . reply, either before or after it is posted.”  Stip. 
¶ 26.  Given the prominence with which the account information of 
the replying user is displayed in the replying tweet, the reply is 
unlikely to be “closely identified in the public mind” with the 
sender, even when the sender of the tweet being replied to is a 
                     
20 Whether the content of retweets initially sent by other users 
constitutes government speech presents a somewhat closer question.  The content 
of a retweet of a tweet sent by another governmental account, Stip. ¶ 37, is 
still squarely government speech.  The content of the retweet of a tweet sent 
by a private non-governmental account, Stip. ¶ 39, would still likely be 
government speech.  Despite the private genesis of the content, the act of 
retweeting by @realDonaldTrump resembles the government’s acceptance of the 
monuments in Pleasant Grove and the government’s approval of the license plate 
designs in Walker, which were sufficient to render the privately originated 
speech governmental in nature. 
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governmental one.  Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760; Walker, 135 S. Ct. 
at 2248.  And, far from “maintain[ing] direct control over the 
messages conveyed” in a user’s replies to the President’s tweets 
(assuming the user retains the ability to reply, i.e., the user 
has not been blocked), the government maintains no control over 
the content of the reply.   Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1760; Walker, 135 
S. Ct. at 2249.  Taken together, these factors support the 
conclusion that replies to the President’s tweets remain the 
private speech of the replying user.  The association that a reply 
has with a governmental sender of the tweet being replied to -- 
the indication that the replying tweet is a reply and its 
appearance in the comment thread accessed from the timeline of the 
governmental sender -- is not sufficient to render the reply 
government speech.21 
Nor is the interactive space of each tweet, as distinguished 
from the content of the tweet, constrained by the notions of 
inherent selectivity and scarcity that the Supreme Court held to 
counsel against the application of forum doctrine in Finley and 
Forbes and in Pleasant Grove City, respectively.  Generally, no 
selection is involved in determining who has the ability to 
                     
21 Retweets again present a closer question.  A retweet appears “in the 
same form as it did on the original [sender]’s timeline,” with the name, picture, 
and handle of the original sender rather than the retweeter, and with an 
additional “notation indicating that the post was retweeted” above the tweet in 
smaller font.  Stip. ¶ 21.  Nonetheless, in the same way the President’s 
retweeting of a tweet sent by a private individual likely renders the 
President’s retweet government speech, a private individual’s retweet of a tweet 
sent by the President is likely private speech rather than government speech. 
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interact directly with the President’s tweets: the 
@realDonaldTrump account is “generally accessible to the public at 
large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting 
criteria,” such that any Twitter user who has not been blocked may 
so engage.  Stip. ¶ 36.  Indeed, just as “a park can accommodate 
many speakers and, over time, many parades and demonstrations”; 
“[t]he Combined Federal Campaign permits hundreds of groups to 
solicit donations from federal employees” as in Cornelius; “[a] 
public university’s student activity fund can provide money for 
many campus activities” as in Rosenberger; “a public university’s 
buildings may offer meeting space for hundreds of student groups” 
as in Widmar; and “[a] school system’s internal mail facilities 
can support the transmission of many messages to and from teachers 
and school administrators” as in Perry Education Ass’n, Pleasant 
Grove City, 555 U.S. at 478, the interactive space of a tweet can 
accommodate an unlimited number of replies and retweets.  Indeed, 
the record establishes that tweets sent by the @realDonaldTrump 
account regularly attract tens of thousands, if not hundreds of 
thousands, of replies and retweets, Stip. ¶¶ 41-43, and nothing 
suggests that the “application of forum analysis” to the 
interactive space associated with a tweet “would lead almost 
inexorably to closing of the forum,” id. at 480.  Rather, the 
interactive space is “capable of accommodating a large number of 
public speakers without defeating [its] essential function,” id. 
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at 478; and indeed, the essential function of a given tweet’s 
interactive space is to allow private speakers to engage with the 
content of the tweet, Stip. ¶ 13, which supports the application 
of forum analysis. 
Ultimately, the delineation of a tweet’s interactive space as 
the putative forum is consistent with the Supreme Court’s directive 
to “focus[] on the access sought by the speaker.”  Cornelius, 473 
U.S. at 801.  When a user is blocked, the most significant 
impediment is the ability to directly interact with a tweet sent 
by the blocking user.  While a blocked user is also limited in 
that the user may not view the content of the blocking user’s 
tweets or view the blocking user’s timeline, those limitations may 
be circumvented entirely by “using an internet browser or other 
application that is not logged in to Twitter, or that is logged in 
to a Twitter account that is not blocked.”  Stip. ¶ 55.  By 
contrast, the ability to interact directly cannot be completely 
reestablished, Stip. ¶¶ 54, 58-59, and that ability -- i.e., access 
to the interactive space -- is therefore best described as the 
access that the individual plaintiffs seek. 
In sum, we conclude that the interactive space associated 
with each of the President’s tweets is not government speech and 
is properly analyzed under the Supreme Court’s forum precedents. 
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C. Classification 
Having concluded that forum analysis is appropriately applied 
to the interactive space associated with a tweet, we turn to the 
question of classification.  “The Supreme Court has recognized 
three types of fora across a spectrum of constitutional protection 
for expressive activity.”  Make the Rd., 378 F.3d at 142.  First, 
traditional public fora are “places which by long tradition or by 
government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate.”  Perry 
Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.  These spaces, like streets and parks, 
“have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, 
and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions.”  Id. (quoting Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (opinion of 
Roberts, J.)).   Absent a well-established history of dedication 
to public use, however, a forum cannot be a traditional public 
forum.  The Supreme Court has “rejected the view that traditional 
public forum status extends beyond its historic confines.”  Forbes, 
523 U.S. at 678 (citing ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 680-81). 
“A second category consists of public property which the state 
has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive 
activity.”  Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.  “To create a forum 
of this type, the government must intend to make the property 
‘generally available,’ to a class of speakers.”  Forbes, 523 U.S. 
at 678 (citations omitted) (quoting Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264).  “The 
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government does not create a public forum by inaction or by 
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a 
nontraditional forum for public discourse,” and we “look[] to the 
policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether it 
intended to designate a place not traditionally open to assembly 
and debate as a public forum.”  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.  
Finally, a space that is susceptible to forum analysis but is “not 
by tradition or designation a forum for public communication,” 
Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46, is termed a “nonpublic forum,” 
Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677. 
Applying this three-part classification framework to the 
interactive space, we can first conclude that the interactive space 
of a tweet sent by @realDonaldTrump is not a traditional public 
forum.  There is no historical practice of the interactive space 
of a tweet being used for public speech and debate since time 
immemorial, for there is simply no extended historical practice as 
to the medium of Twitter.  While the Supreme Court has referenced 
the “vast democratic forums of the Internet,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 868 (1997), has described the internet (including social 
media platforms such as Twitter) as one of “the most important 
places (in a spatial sense) for the exchange of views,” Packingham 
v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017), and has analogized 
the internet to the “essential venues for public gatherings” of 
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streets and parks, id., the lack of historical practice is 
dispositive, see Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678. 
Accordingly, we consider whether the interactive space is a 
designated public forum, with “governmental intent” serving as 
“the touchstone for determining whether a public forum has been 
created.”  Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cohen, 131 F.3d 273, 279 
(2d Cir. 1997).  “Intent is not merely a matter of stated purpose.  
Indeed, it must be inferred from a number of objective factors, 
including: [the government’s] policy and past practice, as well as 
the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive 
activity.”  Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65, 69 (2d Cir. 
1991) (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802-03). 
Here, these factors strongly support the conclusion that the 
interactive space is a designated public forum.  “The 
@realDonaldTrump account is generally accessible to the public at 
large without regard to political affiliation or any other limiting 
criteria,” “any member of the public can view his tweets,” and 
“anyone [with a Twitter account] who wants to follow the account 
[on Twitter] can do so,” unless that person has been blocked.  
Stip. ¶ 36.  Similarly, anyone with a Twitter account who has not 
been blocked may participate in the interactive space by replying 
or retweeting the President’s tweets.  Stip. ¶¶ 21, 22, 28, 36.  
Further, the account -- including all of its constituent components 
-- has been held out by Scavino as a means through which the 
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President “communicates directly with you, the American people!”  
Stip. ¶ 37 (alterations incorporated).  And finally, there can be 
no serious suggestion that the interactive space is incompatible 
with expressive activity: rather, Twitter as a platform is designed 
to allow users “to interact with other Twitter users in relation 
to [their tweets],” Stip. ¶ 13, and users can use Twitter to 
“petition their elected representatives and otherwise engage with 
them in a direct manner,” Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1735.  The 
interactivity of Twitter is one of its defining characteristics, 
and indeed, the interactive space of the President’s tweets 
accommodates a substantial body of expressive activity.  Stip. 
¶¶ 41-43.  Taking these factors together, we conclude that the 
interactive space of a tweet from the @realDonaldTrump account 
constitutes a designated public forum. 
D. Viewpoint Discrimination 
“[T]he extent to which the Government can control access 
depends on the nature of the relevant forum,” Cornelius, 473 U.S. 
at 800, so we next consider whether the blocking of the individual 
plaintiffs is permissible in a designated public forum.  
“Regulation of [a designated public forum] is subject to the same 
limitations as that governing a traditional public forum” -- 
restriction are permissible “only if they are narrowly drawn to 
achieve a compelling state interest.”  ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678-
79; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800.  Regardless of the 
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specific nature of the forum, however, “[v]iewpoint discrimination 
. . . is presumed impermissible when directed against speech 
otherwise within the forum’s limitations.”  Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 
at 830; see also Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763 (“When government 
creates such a forum, in either a literal or ‘metaphysical’ sense, 
some content- and speaker-based restrictions may be allowed.  
However, even in such cases, what we have termed ‘viewpoint 
discrimination’ is forbidden.” (citations omitted) (quoting 
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830-31)). 
Here, the individual plaintiffs were indisputably blocked as 
a result of viewpoint discrimination.  The record establishes that 
“[s]hortly after the Individual Plaintiffs posted the tweets . . . 
in which they criticized the President or his policies, the 
President blocked each of the Individual Plaintiffs,” Stip. ¶ 53, 
and defendants do “not contest Plaintiffs’ allegation that the 
Individual Plaintiffs were blocked from the President’s Twitter 
account because the Individual Plaintiffs posted tweets that 
criticized the President or his policies.”  Stip. at 1.  The 
continued exclusion of the individual plaintiffs based on 
viewpoint is, therefore, impermissible under the First Amendment.22 
                     
22 Even if the interactive space associated with the content of a tweet 
constituted a nonpublic forum, the exclusion of the individual plaintiffs would 
not withstand First Amendment scrutiny.  “Control over access to a nonpublic 
forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the 
distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum 
and are viewpoint neutral.”  Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806.  The blocking of the 
individual plaintiffs, which resulted from their “tweets that criticized the 
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Defendants contend that the blocking of the individual 
plaintiffs is permissible because the President retains a personal 
First Amendment interest in choosing the people with whom he 
associates and retains the right not to engage with (i.e., the 
right to ignore) the individual plaintiffs.  Further, they argue, 
the individual plaintiffs have no right to be heard by a government 
audience and no right to have their views amplified by the 
government.  While those propositions are accurate as statements 
of law, they nonetheless do not render the blocking of the 
individual plaintiffs constitutionally permissible. 
To be clear, a public official does not lose his First 
Amendment rights upon taking office.  Cf. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410, 417 (2006).  “The interest of the public in hearing 
all sides of a public issue,” an interest that the First Amendment 
seeks to protect, “is hardly advanced by extending more protection 
to citizen-critics than to [public officials].”  Bond v. Floyd, 
385 U.S. 116, 136 (1966).  That is, no set of plaintiffs could 
credibly argue that they “have a constitutional right to prevent 
[government officials] from exercising their own rights” under the 
First Amendment.  X-Men Sec., Inc. v. Pataki, 196 F.3d 56, 70 (2d 
Cir. 1999).  Further, “[n]othing in the First Amendment or in [the 
Supreme] Court’s case law interpreting it suggests that the rights 
                     
President or his policies,” Stip. at 1, is not viewpoint-neutral, and is 
therefore impermissible “regardless of how the property is categorized under 
forum doctrine,” Wandering Dago, 879 F.3d at 39.  
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to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers 
to listen or respond to individuals’ communications on public 
issues.”  Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 
271, 285 (1984).  No First Amendment harm arises when a 
government’s “challenged conduct is simply to ignore the 
[speaker],” as the Supreme Court has affirmed that “[t]hat it is 
free to do.”  Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 441 
U.S. 463, 466 (1979) (per curiam).  Stated otherwise, “[a] person’s 
right to speak is not infringed when government simply ignores 
that person while listening to others,” or when the government 
“amplifies” the voice of one speaker over those of others.  Minn. 
State Bd., 465 U.S. at 288.  Nonetheless, when the government goes 
beyond merely amplifying certain speakers’ voices and not engaging 
with others, and actively restricts “the right of an individual to 
speak freely [and] to advocate ideas,” it treads into territory 
proscribed by the First Amendment.  Id. at 286 (quoting Smith, 441 
U.S. at 464). 
Consideration of Twitter’s two features for limiting 
interaction between users -- muting and blocking -- is useful in 
addressing the potentially conflicting constitutional prerogatives 
of the government as listener on the one hand and of speakers on 
the other, as muting and blocking differ in relevant ways.  As 
Twitter explains, “[m]ut[ing] is a feature that allows [a user] to 
remove an account’s Tweets from [the user’s] timeline without 
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unfollowing or blocking that account.”  How to Mute.  For muted 
accounts that the muting account does not follow on Twitter, 
“[r]eplies and mentions will not appear” in the muting account’s 
notifications, nor will mentions by the muted account.  Id.  That 
is, muting allows a user to ignore an account with which the user 
does not wish to engage.  The muted account may still attempt to 
engage with the muting account -- it may still reply to tweets 
sent by the muting account, among other capabilities -- but the 
muting account generally will not see these replies.23  Critically, 
however, the muted account may still reply directly to the muting 
account, even if that reply is ultimately ignored. 
Blocking, by contrast, goes further.  The blocking user “will 
not see any tweets posted by the blocked user” just as a muting 
user would not see tweets posted by a muted user, but whereas 
muting preserves the muted account’s ability to reply to a tweet 
sent by the muting account, blocking precludes the blocked user 
from “see[ing] or reply[ing] to the blocking user’s tweets” 
entirely.  Stip. ¶ 28.  The elimination of the blocked user’s 
ability to reply directly is more than the blocking user merely 
ignoring the blocked user; it is the blocking user limiting the 
blocked user’s right to speak in a discrete, measurable way.  
                     
23 These replies will appear in the muting account’s notifications if the 
muting account follows the muted account.  Of course, the fact that one account 
follows a second account strongly indicates some desire by the first user to 
engage with the second user.  Stip. ¶ 19. 
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Muting equally vindicates the President’s right to ignore certain 
speakers and to selectively amplify the voices of certain others 
but -- unlike blocking -- does so without restricting the right of 
the ignored to speak. 
Given these differing consequences of muting and blocking, we 
find unpersuasive defendants’ contention that a public official’s 
muting and blocking are equivalent, and equally constitutional, 
means of choosing not to engage with his constituents.  Implicit 
in this argument is the assumption that a reply to a tweet is 
directed only at the user who sent the tweet being replied to.  
Were that so, defendants would be correct in that there is no 
difference between the inability to send a direct reply (as with 
blocking) and the inability to have that direct reply heard by the 
sender of the initial tweet being responded to (as with muting).  
But this assumption is not supported in the record: a reply is 
visible to others, Stip. ¶ 22, and may itself be replied to by 
other users, Stip. ¶¶ 57-58.  The audience for a reply extends 
more broadly than the sender of the tweet being replied to, and 
blocking restricts the ability of a blocked user to speak to that 
audience.  While the right to speak and the right to be heard may 
be functionally identical if the speech is directed at only one 
listener, they are not when there is more than one. 
In sum, we conclude that the blocking of the individual 
plaintiffs as a result of the political views they have expressed 
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is impermissible under the First Amendment.  While we must 
recognize, and are sensitive to, the President’s personal First 
Amendment rights, he cannot exercise those rights in a way that 
infringes the corresponding First Amendment rights of those who 
have criticized him. 
To be sure, we do not suggest that the impact on the 
individual plaintiffs (and, by extension, on the Knight Institute) 
is of the highest magnitude.  It is not.  But the law is also 
clear: the First Amendment recognizes, and protects against, even 
de minimis harms.  See Six Star Holdings, LLC v. City of Milwaukee, 
821 F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 2016) (rejecting an argument of “de 
minimis” First Amendment harm and approving an award of nominal 
damages); Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1221 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(similar); KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville, 465 F.3d 1256, 
1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (similar); Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 
1072 (8th Cir. 2000) (similar); cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 
373 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably 
constitutes irreparable injury.”); N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. 
Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 486 (2d Cir. 2013) (same).  Thus, even though 
defendants are entirely correct in contending that the individual 
plaintiffs may continue to access the content of the President’s 
tweets, Stip. ¶¶ 55-56, and that they may tweet replies to earlier 
replies to the President’s tweets, Stip. ¶¶ 57-58, the blocking of 
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the individual plaintiffs has the discrete impact of preventing 
them from interacting directly with the President’s tweets, Stip. 
¶ 54, thereby restricting a real, albeit narrow, slice of speech.  
No more is needed to violate the Constitution. 
IV. Relief 
As plaintiffs seek both injunctive and declaratory relief, we 
turn, then, to the question of the proper remedy to be afforded 
here.24  Defendants suggest that we categorically lack authority 
to enjoin the President, a proposition we do not accept.  Stated 
simply, “separation-of-powers doctrine does not bar every exercise 
of jurisdiction over the President of the United States.”  Nixon 
v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753-54 (1982).  Rather, “it is . . . 
settled that the President is subject to judicial process in 
appropriate circumstances,” Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 
(1997), and the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the notion of 
“an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from 
judicial process under all circumstances,” id. at 704 (quoting 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)).  
                     
24 We do not analyze separately the argument that the blocking of the 
individual plaintiffs violates their right “to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances” under the First Amendment’s Petition Clause.  The First 
Amendment right to speech and petition “are inseparable,” and generally “there 
is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection” to one over 
the other.  McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985).  “There may arise cases 
where the special concerns of the Petition Clause would provide a sound basis 
for a distinct analysis,” Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 389 
(2011), but this case does not present one of them. 
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However, “a court, before exercising jurisdiction, must 
balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served 
against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of 
the Executive Branch.”  Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754.  A 
four-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court has explained that 
while “in general ‘this court has no jurisdiction of a bill to 
enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties,’” 
Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 475, 499 (1866), “left 
open the question whether the President might be subject to a 
judicial injunction requiring the performance of a purely 
‘ministerial’ duty.”  Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802–03 (plurality 
opinion) (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at 499).  
Franklin’s acknowledgment of the door left open by Mississippi v. 
Johnson is consistent with the balancing approach articulated by 
the Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald: an injunction directing the 
performance of a ministerial duty represents a minimal “danger[] 
of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive 
Branch” as compared to imposition posed by the injunction 
considered in Mississippi v. Johnson. 
In this case, the intrusion on executive prerogative 
presented by an injunction directing the unblocking of the 
individual plaintiffs would be minimal.  Any such injunction would 
not direct the President to execute the laws in a certain way, nor 
would it mandate that he pursue any substantive policy ends.  Even 
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accepting that the President’s blocking decisions in the first 
instance are discretionary, the duty to unblock -- following a 
holding that such blocking was unconstitutional -- would not be, 
as the President must act in compliance with the Constitution and 
other laws.  Cf. Swan, 100 F.3d at 977 (“[The asserted statutory] 
duty, if it exists, is ministerial and not discretionary, for the 
President is bound to abide by the requirements of duly enacted 
and otherwise constitutional statutes.”).  That is, the correction 
of an unconstitutional act far more closely resembles the 
performance of “a mere ministerial duty,” where “nothing [is] left 
to discretion,” than the performance of a “purely executive and 
political” duty requiring the exercise of discretion vested in the 
President.  Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) at 499.  An 
injunction directing the unblocking of the individual plaintiffs 
would therefore impose a duty that far more closely resembles the 
duties considered in Swan, see 100 F.3d at 977-78, and in National 
Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 608 (D.C. Cir. 
1974) (defining a “ministerial duty” as “a simple, definite duty, 
arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist, and imposed 
by law”), than the highly discretionary duty considered in 
Mississippi v. Johnson.  The ways to faithfully execute the 
Reconstruction Acts passed by Congress following the Civil War are 
uncountable in number, but “[t]he law require[s] the performance 
of a single specific act” here.  Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 
Case 1:17-cv-05205-NRB   Document 72   Filed 05/23/18   Page 71 of 75
SPA.71
Case 18-1691, Document 25, 08/07/2018, 2362018, Page120 of 124
72 
(4 Wall) at 499.  No government official, after all, possesses the 
discretion to act unconstitutionally.  
We need not, however, ultimately resolve the question of 
whether injunctive relief may be awarded against the President, as 
injunctive relief directed at Scavino and declaratory relief 
remain available.  While we find entirely unpersuasive the 
Government’s parade of horribles regarding the judicial 
interference in executive affairs presented by an injunction 
directing the President to comply with constitutional 
restrictions, we nonetheless recognize that “[a]s a matter of 
comity, courts should normally direct legal process to a lower 
Executive official even though the effect of the process is to 
restrain or compel the President.”  Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 
709 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per curiam).  Subordinate officials 
may, of course, be enjoined by the courts.  See, e.g., Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 584, 588 (1952) 
(affirming an injunction directed at the Secretary of Commerce); 
see also, e.g., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 
F.3d 554, 605 (4th Cir.) (en banc) (vacating an injunction only to 
the extent it was directed at the President), vacated and remanded, 
138 S. Ct. 353 (2017).  Injunctive relief directed against Scavino 
would certainly implicate fewer separation-of-powers concerns, see 
Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802-03, but we also recognize that “the 
strong remedy of injunction,” Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 
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F.2d 311, 316 (1st Cir. 1992), should be sparingly employed even 
when those constitutional concerns are not present; see, e.g., 
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714-15 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
Accordingly, though we conclude that injunctive relief may be 
awarded in this case -- at minimum, against Scavino -- we decline 
to do so at this time because declaratory relief is likely to 
achieve the same purpose.  The Supreme Court has directed that we 
should “assume it is substantially likely that the President and 
other executive . . . officials would abide by an authoritative 
interpretation of [a] . . . constitutional provision,” Franklin, 
505 U.S. at 803 (plurality opinion); see Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 
at 464 (citing Franklin, 505 U.S. at 803 (plurality opinion)); see 
also Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 96 (2d Cir. 2017); Made 
in the USA, 242 F.3d at 1310; Swan, 100 F.3d at 980; L.A. Cty. Bar 
Ass’n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Were this court 
to issue the requested declaration, we must assume that it is 
substantially likely that [government officials] . . . would abide 
by our authoritative determination.”), and there is simply no 
reason to depart from this assumption at this time.  Declaratory 
judgment is appropriate under the factors that the Second Circuit 
directs us to consider, see Dow Jones & Co. v. Harrods Ltd., 346 
F.3d 357, 359-60 (2d Cir. 2003), and a declaration will therefore 
issue: the blocking of the individual plaintiffs from the 
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@realDonaldTrump account because of their expressed political 
views violates the First Amendment. 
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is,” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), and we have held that the President’s 
blocking of the individual plaintiffs is unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment.  Because no government official is above the 
law and because all government officials are presumed to follow 
the law once the judiciary has said what the law is, we must assume 
that the President and Scavino will remedy the blocking we have 
held to be unconstitutional. 
V. Conclusion 
We conclude that we have jurisdiction to entertain this 
dispute.  Plaintiffs have established legal injuries that are 
traceable to the conduct of the President and Daniel Scavino and, 
despite defendants’ suggestions to the contrary, their injuries 
are redressable by a favorable judicial declaration.  Plaintiffs 
lack standing, however, to sue Sarah Huckabee Sanders, who is 
dismissed as a defendant.  Hope Hicks is also dismissed as a 
defendant, in light of her resignation as White House 
Communications Director. 
Turning to the merits of plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim, 
we hold that the speech in which they seek to engage is protected 
by the First Amendment and that the President and Scavino exert 
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governmental control over certain aspects of the @realDonaldTrump 
account, including the interactive space of the tweets sent from 
the account. That i~teractive space is susceptible to analysis 
under the Supreme Court's forum doctrines, and is properly 
characterized as a designated public forum. The viewpoint-based 
exclusion of the individual plaintiffs from that designated public 
forum 1s proscribed by the First Amendment and cannot be justified 
by the President's personal First Amendment interests. 
In sum, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted in 
part and denied 1n part, and plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary 
judgment is granted in part and denied in part. The Clerk of the 
Court is directed to terminate the motions pending at docket 
entries 34 and 42. 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated: New York, New York 
May 23, 2018 
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